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Abstract
It is well known that the government’s complete failure to
enforce a law can nullify that law. But what are the effects of
partial enforcement? This Article shows that imperfect
enforcement can alter the de facto content of the written law in
predictable and beneficial ways. Specifically, in the tax
compliance context, even if perfect enforcement were costless, it
would not always be socially optimal. When improving the
substantive law is infeasible, the enforcement agency can effect
beneficial changes in the law by adopting a probabilistic
enforcement scheme that varies according to the category of
taxpayer and type of transaction. Our model shows that properly
“measuring” enforcement in this manner can increase overall
social welfare without reducing tax revenues. Unlike case-by-case
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discretionary enforcement, which often results in costly
uncertainty, measured enforcement operates via systemic,
published policies that legal actors can respond to predictably.
Accordingly, measured enforcement can offer substantial benefits
not readily obtained through traditional lawmaking or
enforcement schemes.
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I. Introduction
An unenforced law is tantamount to no law at all. 1 Of
course, enforcing the law is costly. As a result, the government
cannot ensure 100% compliance. 2 Scholars often assume that
perfect enforcement of the laws, though unrealistic, is the ideal,
and have focused on achieving the highest level of compliance
possible at the lowest cost. 3 More sophisticated analyses
contemplate the benefits of discretionary enforcement, which
allows a prosecutor or other enforcer leeway in determining
whether conduct that may nominally fall within a law’s ambit
actually deserves punishment. 4 These latter approaches
1. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 584 (1995)
(“[R]ules for assessing taxes or awarding benefits based on income or other
criteria are useless unless those rules are enforced.” (footnote omitted)); ALBERT
EINSTEIN, My First Impressions of the U.S.A., in IDEAS AND OPINIONS 3, 6 (2010)
(“The prestige of government has undoubtedly been lowered considerably by the
Prohibition law. For nothing is more destructive of respect for the government
and the law of the land than passing laws which cannot be enforced.”); Kenji
Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment (Measure for Measure), 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
683, 685 (2009) (“[A]n unenforced law is worse than no law at all.”).
2. See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative
Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (“[N]o agency has limitless resources, and
perfect enforcement of any statute is impossible. An administrative agency
cannot function without setting priorities.” (citation omitted)); Edward K.
Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 655, 675–78 (2006) (explaining that enforcement of tax evasion laws is
“predictably spotty” and that structural safeguards such as employers’
remission of employee taxes explain a large part of the approximately 80% tax
compliance rate); Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1142 (2003) (“The IRS has expansive enforcement
powers, but it has insufficient resources to ensure that all taxpayers comply
with the tax laws.”).
3. See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J.
ECON. SURV. 267, 271–72 (1997) (discussing the social cost of the imposition of
penalties); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 71–72 (2000) (discussing
methods for improving compliance and decreasing costs).
4. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 722 (1988) (“Intuitively, when the arrest
process does not do a good job of screening out the innocent . . . , then discretion
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effectively allow the enforcer to tailor the substantive law on a
case-by-case basis. 5
In both approaches, uncertainty is viewed as a cost to the
regulated parties. 6 Even when enforcers enjoy discretion,
standard models suggest that like cases should be treated alike to
minimize costs. 7 However, in the last few decades, scholars have
begun to consider the potentially beneficial effects of
uncertainty. 8 In these models, enforcers do not concern
themselves with treating like cases alike, instead adopting an
enforcement “roulette wheel” whereby legal actors who violate
the nominal law are not sure if they will be subject to
punishment, so they calculate probabilities that their actions will
be sanctioned. 9 Interestingly, these models have shown that
under certain conditions, this probabilistic enforcement can
increase social welfare. 10

at the prosecution stage is preferred. On the other hand, when the prosecutor
can be confident that most defendants are guilty, the restriction to a uniform
offer is preferred.”); cf. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Consequences of Compliance and
Deterrence Models of Law Enforcement for the Exercise of Police Discretion, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1984) (exploring how the shift from compliancefocused to deterrence-focused policing affected police officers’ and managers’ use
of discretion).
5. See John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement,
6 LAW & POL’Y 385, 387 (1984) (“Enforcement officials inevitably practice
considerable discretion in resolving legal ambiguities in order to achieve
intended policy results.” (citation omitted)); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the
Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1550 (2007) (“In the law enforcement
context, vague laws are objectionable because they vest so much discretion in
the police that ‘enforcement’ decisions are, in effect, lawmaking.” (citation
omitted)).
6. See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities
Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 1011–12 (2009) (“[R]educing legal
uncertainty is costly . . . .”).
7. See Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX
J. 113, 113 (1990) (“Even in the utilitarian context, there is a good case for
viewing horizontal equity as an independent norm.”); see also Martin v.
Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (“Discretion is not whim, and
limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic
principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.” (citation omitted)).
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.
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In this Article, we consider probabilistic models of
enforcement in the context of tax compliance. In so doing, we
extend existing models in a manner that makes uncertainty more
widely applicable as a potential enforcement mechanism. Unlike
previous scholarship, we conduct a comprehensive normative
analysis of the implications of our novel probabilistic enforcement
approach. 11
We begin by considering the most basic models of tax
compliance, in which the audit rate is set in advance and
unchangeable, and the modelers attempt to determine the
responses of taxpayers with various characteristics, such as
income levels and risk preferences. 12 These models are merely
predictive, offering the enforcer no ability to change its strategy
in response to taxpayer behavior. 13 In more sophisticated models,
the taxing authority responds to the behavior of taxpayers and
adapts its audit scheme accordingly. 14
Some of these models examine the effects of uncertainty on
taxpayers. 15 Because each taxpayer is subject to an “audit
11. See infra Part III.
12. See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE
818, 824–25 (1998) (“A weakness of the Allingham–Sandmo model is that it
assumes that the probability of audit is constant.”); see also Michael G.
Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J.
PUB. ECON. 323, 324–27 (1972) (introducing a basic static model of tax
compliance).
13. See Andreoni, supra note 12, at 824–25 (noting that models such as
Allingham–Sandmo assume that audit rates do not change in response to
taxpayer behavior).
14. See id. at 825 (“Recently, researchers have developed a more general
theoretical framework in which the probability of audit is a function of reported
income and is determined jointly with cheating as part of an equilibrium.”); see
also Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Honesty and Evasion in the Tax
Compliance Game, 25 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1–2 (1994) (referring to work “that
incorporates the strategic behavior of the tax agency into the formal analysis,
providing a link between tax agency audit policies and taxpayer reporting
decisions”).
15. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax
Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 374 (2005) (“[G]iven the existing incentives to
under-comply with the tax laws, maybe the deterrence value of a little legal
uncertainty will at least help to even things out.”); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation, 18 J.
PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (1982) (“Most of our analysis is focused on the desirability of
random taxation.”); Laurence Weiss, The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and

1684

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679 (2013)

lottery,” 16 which yields uncertain outcomes, risk-averse taxpayers
may behave quite differently than risk-neutral taxpayers do.17
Specifically, risk-averse taxpayers experience greater costs from
the uncertainty of being audited, 18 which can lead them to forgo
the uncertainty of a tax penalty by honestly reporting their
incomes and staying well within the letter of the tax law. 19 Of
course, risk aversion is no substitute in these models for strict
enforcement; rather, it merely tempers the detrimental effects of
an imperfect enforcement system that cannot prevent all
cheating. 20
In contrast to the prevailing assumption that full
enforcement of the tax laws would be ideal, a few scholars have
argued that fostering less than 100% tax compliance with the
nominal laws may actually increase social welfare. 21 These
Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1343, 1348 (1976)
(“[T]he possible desirability of permitting incentives to cheat is implied by, and
implies, the desirability of using a random rate in preference to a certain rate
yielding the same revenue.”); see also Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic
Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV. 489, 493–502 (2011) (discussing various
models involving tax law uncertainty).
16. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Enforcement For Gamers: High
Penalties or Strict Disclosure Rules?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 56 (2009)
(“Traditionally, a major attraction of tax shelters to gamers was the opportunity
to play the audit lottery.” (footnote omitted)).
17. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
18. See Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit,
Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 635 n.263
(2006) (“[T]he deterrent effect of any given penalty on risk-averse potential [tax]
offenders will exceed its expected value . . . .” (citations omitted)).
19. See Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian, Tax Preparers, in THE
CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 201, 205 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds.,
2004) (“If taxpayers are averse to the risk of an audit, they report more income
as their uncertainty rises.”); Suzanne Scotchmer, The Effect of Tax Advisors on
Tax Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 182,
187 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) (“The risk-averse taxpayer
may cope with involuntary risk by reporting conservatively.”); Margaret H.
Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9, 29 (2010)
(“Fearful of the high penalties for tax evasion, risk-averse taxpayers will . . . try
to secure the placement of their returns in the safe harbor zone.”).
20. See infra Part II.B.1.
21. See, e.g., J.C. Baldry, The Enforcement of Income Tax Laws: Efficiency
Implications, 60 ECON. REC. 156, 156–57 (1984) (arguing that when the
marginal cost of enforcement is positive, less than full enforcement may result
in a budget surplus when taxpayers are risk-averse); Frank A. Cowell, The
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scholars remind us that the imposition of taxes can cause
economic distortions, such as dampening productivity,
misallocating resources, and decreasing consumer demand. 22 By
“measuring” enforcement (in our terminology), these deadweight
losses can be mitigated, sometimes so much so that the revenue
lost from tax evasion is more than counterbalanced by tax
revenues collected from compliant taxpayers on the income
generated from their increased productivity, investment, and the
like. 23 Of course, improving the substantive law directly would
often be the ideal approach. 24 When doing so is infeasible,
measured enforcement may become a “second best” solution. 25
However, most of these models rely on taxpayer risk aversion
to achieve their effects. 26 Other models rely on unrealistic
assumptions about tax enforcement, such as a lack of
discretionary authority on the part of the enforcement agency. 27
In this Article, we show that by using its discretion to
Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion, 37 BULL. ECON. RES. 163, 183 (1985) (“[T]he
government may be able to increase social welfare . . . by actually encouraging
dishonesty . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Serge-Christophe Kolm, A Note on
Optimum Tax Evasion, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 265, 265–70 (1973) (suggesting, in a
response to Allingham and Sandmo, that allowing some tax evasion could
increase overall utility); Jonathan Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic
Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 345, 346 (1985) (“[I]n some
circumstances tax evasion can contribute to economic efficiency.”); Weiss, supra
note 15, at 1347 (“[C]heating may give rise to a welfare gain by making final
wealth variable.”). See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 37 (1975) (arguing that to
prevent “overenforcement,” the legislature does not set the tax enforcer’s budget
at the level at which marginal revenue equals marginal enforcement costs).
22. See supra note 21.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See Cowell, supra note 21, at 183 (“[T]he structure of the second-best
problem which one is solving [is such that] if taxes are distortionary and evasion
provides a way of overcoming such distortions then the social value of reducing
evasion becomes ambiguous.”).
25. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 12 (1956) (“The general theorem of second best
states that if one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled a second
best optimum situation is achieved only by departing from all other optimum
conditions.”).
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See, e.g., Garoupa, supra note 3, at 268–75 (aiming for the highest
possible level of enforcement); see also infra Part II.B.
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differentiate nominally uniform tax laws by adjusting the level of
enforcement for different classes of taxpayers, the government
may reduce deadweight losses from taxation, while maintaining
or increasing its overall tax revenue, even for risk-neutral
taxpayers and under realistic assumptions about tax
enforcement. For example, by setting the audit rate for sellers of
a good with positive externalities (such as books) lower than the
one for sellers of a good with negative externalities (such as
gasoline), the taxing authority can achieve the same effect on the
laws that different substantive tax rates would—and similarly
generate differentiated behavior among differently situated
taxpayers. For this and other situations we present below, these
differentiating effects of probabilistic, measured enforcement can
lead to overall increases in social welfare and tax revenue when
the taxing authority properly takes account of the relevant supply
and demand curves and adjusts its enforcement strategy
accordingly.
This finding has important benefits and consequences. First,
it does not depend upon the risk aversion of taxpayers.28 Some
taxpayers—such as large corporations and very wealthy
individuals—may have very low or even no risk aversion when
considering an issue implicating tax compliance behavior. 29
Relatedly, our model dispenses with many of the assumptions of
previous models, such as the shape of taxpayers’ supply and
demand curves, the “quality” of consumer goods, and the nature
of penalties for noncompliance. 30 Second, our model suggests that
28. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
29. See Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 NAT’L
TAX J. 877, 882 (2004) (“[T]he assumption of risk aversion seems unsatisfactory
for a large publicly-held firm, because presumably the shareholders hold
diversified portfolios, implying that the firm should behave as if it is riskneutral, even if its shareholders are not.”). Some corporate managers will
certainly exhibit risk aversion in their decisionmaking processes, but large,
publicly traded companies will be much closer to risk neutrality than closely
held corporations or private individuals. See id. (explaining why publicly held
corporations are likely to behave as if they are risk neutral); Joel Slemrod,
Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 36
(2007) (“Arguably, we would expect large public companies to act in a riskneutral manner, rather than like the risk-averse individuals in the Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) model.”).
30. See infra Part III.
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in choosing who to audit, the taxing authority effectively has
broad power to fine-tune the de facto content of substantive tax
laws in order to achieve ends that may not be politically or
administratively feasible by the legislature or through the
substantive rulemaking process. 31 That is, by engaging in
measured enforcement, the tax authority can use its “on-theground” enforcement power to fine-tune—indeed, alter—the
effect of statutes and regulations. 32 In more theoretical terms,
the tax agency can achieve a beneficial price discrimination of
sorts in applicable tax rates, normally reserved to the
by
monopolistic
substantive
lawmaking
process, 33
differentiating the enforcement of otherwise uniform laws. 34
Although the existing literature has recognized that
differentiated substantive tax laws—for instance, Ramsey 35 and
Pigouvian taxation 36—can increase social welfare, scholars have
not fully appreciated the wide-ranging power of administrative
agencies to effectively tailor substantive law via their
enforcement strategies. 37

31. See infra Parts III–IV.
32. See infra Parts III–IV.
33. We thank Jordan Barry for this metaphor.
34. Price discrimination—that is, the ability to charge different prices to
different consumers—is widely known to reduce the deadweight welfare losses
caused by monopolies. See, e.g., SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES
37 (2004) (“The deadweight loss imposed by a monopolist can be mitigated, and
possibly eliminated, if the monopolist can discriminate on price.”).
35. See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1420 n.10
(2006) (“Under Ramsey taxation, we should levy a tax on goods with low
elasticity of demand because the quantities consumed are likely to change less
when subject to taxation as compared to goods with high elasticities, thus
minimizing deadweight loss.”).
36. See David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxation, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1057, 1108 (2007) (“A cost-internalizing tax, sometimes referred to as a
‘Pigouvian tax’ (named for the economist A.C. Pigou), is designed to make the
person who engages in an activity bear all and only the costs associated with the
activity.” (citation omitted)).
37. See infra Part II.A–B. In this regard, the originality of our thesis is that
changes in agency-level enforcement (not rulemaking) can lead to de facto
changes in the law that have the same effect as customization at the substantive
lawmaking level. See infra Parts III–IV.
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Although legislators and rulemakers can respond
dynamically to these de facto changes in the content of the law
as applied, such power to tailor the law inevitably raises concerns
and some potentially adverse consequences. Notably, measured
enforcement may be less transparent than statutes or regulations
that set different tax rates for different commodities. 38 Lack of
transparency impedes accountability, which may set the stage for
potential abuses. 39 Differential enforcement may also raise
fairness concerns. 40 In addition, measured enforcement shifts
power from the legislature or agency-level rulemaking process—
which typically involves some form of democratic participation—
to the discretion of the enforcement agency, which could raise due
process and separation of powers concerns. 41
Yet, each of these concerns about measured enforcement is in
essence a concern about the existing system, which inevitably
allows for auditing of only a small fraction of taxpayers, selected
in a nontransparent way. 42 Any strategy adopted by the tax
agency to audit taxpayers—other than one that is wholly
random—will have a de facto impact on the substantive tax law. 43
For example, when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) set audit
priorities that focused on high-risk noncompliance areas such as
high-income nonfilers and users of offshore credit cards, 44 it
increased the likelihood that other types of taxpayers could evade
taxes undetected, implicitly allowing greater departures from the
38. See infra Part IV.B.3.
39. See, e.g., Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Account Me In: Agencies in Quest of
Accountability, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 611, 653–55 (2011) (explaining that in the 1970s
the Food & Drug Administration strove to “increas[e] transparency to increase
agency accountability and reduce abuses”).
40. See infra Part IV.B.5.
41. See infra note 268.
42. See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in the preceding sentence, or in
any other provision of law, shall be construed to require the disclosure of
standards used or to be used for the selection of returns for examination, or data
used or to be used for determining such standards . . . .”).
43. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
44. See IRS Sets New Audit Priorities, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept.
2002), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Sets-New-Audit-Priorities (last visited Oct. 1,
2013) (identifying priority areas for IRS audits) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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law by the latter group of taxpayers. In contrast to these
unintended consequences of discretionary enforcement, our model
contemplates a more conscious and focused allocation of resources
that strives to increase social welfare and, in so doing, can more
consciously address the potentially adverse consequences of
imperfect enforcement. 45 Moreover, our model intentionally
increases the transparency of audit-selection criteria.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part II
reviews standard economic modeling of tax compliance. It
discusses both traditional tax compliance models and
conventional accounts of the effects of uncertainty on tax
compliance and enforcement. In Part III, we introduce a novel
model of tax uncertainty that relies on measured enforcement,
whereby enforcement rates intentionally differ by the type of
taxpayer and transaction, so as to induce increased compliance in
some areas and decreased compliance in others. We show, using a
basic formal model, that a measured enforcement strategy can
reduce economic distortions while maintaining or increasing tax
revenues. For example, in the context of a sales tax, measured
enforcement can reduce both (1) deadweight losses resulting from
decreased demand for taxed goods and (2) allocative distortions
resulting from goods with externalities (positive or negative).
Finally, Part IV of the Article considers some implications
and caveats of measured tax enforcement. Unlike previous
scholarship, this Part undertakes a comprehensive review of the
potential costs and complications of intentionally injecting
uncertainty into the enforcement process. 46 Although we
recognize that this sort of measured enforcement can sometimes
be harmful, we argue that with a sufficiently knowledgeable
enforcement agency operating under controlled conditions, this
approach can lead to large welfare gains that may not easily be
replicated by direct changes to the substantive law.47 Accordingly,
we conclude that measured enforcement is in effect a form of de
facto substantive lawmaking and, like de jure lawmaking, can
yield positive or negative results depending on the details of
45.
46.
47.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
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implementation. This insight may yield benefits in many areas of
the law.
II. Standard Economic Modeling of Tax Compliance
Traditional accounts of tax compliance generally assume that
if enforcement were costless, it would be in the government’s
interest to maximize the amount of tax it collects. 48 This
assumption implies that imperfect enforcement—which is
inevitable, given enforcement costs—decreases social welfare by
reducing overall tax revenues. More recently, some scholars have
suggested that probabilistic tax enforcement may actually
increase tax compliance relative to perfect enforcement, assuming
that taxpayers are risk averse. 49 Specifically, these scholars
assert that uncertainty in enforcement makes the costs of
noncompliance higher for risk-averse taxpayers relative to
completely certain (but imperfect) enforcement. 50
A few of the models relying on uncertainty also suggest that
tolerating some “cheating” may increase social welfare if
taxpayers are risk averse because imperfect compliance can
reduce the deadweight losses caused by taxation. 51 These models
are an important building block for the model we introduce in the
next Part. 52 However, just a few models suggest (as we do) that,
regardless of the risk profile of the taxpayers, imperfect tax
enforcement, if correctly structured, can yield results superior to
those of a costless system of perfect enforcement. 53 We discuss
and critique below first the traditional models of tax compliance,
then the more recent models.

48. See infra Part II.A.
49. See infra notes 77–88 and accompanying text.
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. See, e.g., Cowell, supra note 21, at 181–82 (arguing that deadweight
losses may be reduced by noncompliance); Weiss, supra note 15, at 1343–44
(same).
52. See infra Part III.
53. See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
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A. Traditional Models
The basic model of tax compliance was developed by Michael
Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, 54 and is based on Gary Becker’s
economic model of crime. 55 The model assumes that enforcement
is costly and, thus, imperfect. 56 Accordingly, the taxing authority
can only audit a fraction of all taxpayers, which allows some
(possibly most) taxpayers to cheat and escape penalty. 57 In the
most basic form of the Allingham–Sandmo model, the taxpayer
faces the choice of either (1) complying with the tax law and thus
paying a known amount, or (2) cheating but facing the possibility
of detection and a sanction that includes a penalty in addition to
the amount of the tax. 58 Thus, under the Allingham–Sandmo
model, the expected cost of cheating depends on the audit rate
(which is constrained by the government’s enforcement budget)
and the amount of the sanction. 59
For example, assume that a taxpayer is deciding whether or
not to report $5,000 of poker winnings. Assume that the
applicable tax rate is 20%, so the tax at stake is $1,000. Assume
further that if the taxpayer fails to report the winnings and is
54. See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 12, at 324–27 (introducing the
basic static model of tax compliance).
55. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169, 172–84 (1968) (introducing an economic model for crime and
punishment).
56. See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 12, at 324 (“The tax declaration
decision is a decision under uncertainty. The reason for this is that failure to
report one’s full income to the tax authorities does not automatically provoke a
reaction in the form of a penalty.”).
57. See id. (explaining that noncompliance does not necessarily result in a
penalty).
58. “The model can be written as EU = (1 - p) u (y + x) + pu (y - Fx) where
EU is the expected utility, u is the utility function, p is the probability of audit
(with assumed detection and sanction), y is the legal after-tax income, x is the
amount of undeclared taxes, and F is the penalty applicable to the unpaid
taxes.” Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1463 n.46 (2003).
59. See id. at 1463 (“In the [Allingham–Sandmo] model . . . tax compliance
depends on the probability of detection and the punishment if cheating is
detected.” (footnote omitted)); Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 12, at 324
(explaining that a cheating taxpayer’s payoff will depend on whether or not the
cheating is detected).
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caught, the taxpayer will owe the $1,000 plus a penalty of $200,
or $1,200 in total. 60 If the audit rate is 1%, assuming that audits
detect all evasion and all evaders must pay the tax and the
penalty, the expected cost of noncompliance for a risk-neutral
taxpayer is only $12, 61 while compliance costs $1,000. In this
basic model, therefore, at any realistic audit rate, an amoral
taxpayer should always decide to cheat.62
Of course, this model is simplified, and contains several
important assumptions. Perhaps most importantly, it treats the
audit rate as exogenously determined, rather than being affected
by the taxpayer’s reporting behavior. Tax authorities, including
the IRS, typically do respond to taxpayer behavior in setting
audit rates, 63 and taxpayers’ reporting behavior may, in turn,

60. For simplicity, this example ignores the time value of money. In reality,
interest generally would apply to the taxpayer’s liability. For example, the
Internal Revenue Code generally imposes interest on underpayments of tax. See
I.R.C. § 6601(a) (2012) (“If any amount of tax . . . is not paid on or before the last
date prescribed for payment, interest on such amount at the underpayment rate
established . . . shall be paid for the period from such last date to the date
paid.”); id. § 6601(f) (providing for netting of underpayment and overpayment
interest). But cf. id. § 6601(c) (allowing suspension of interest in certain
circumstances).
61. The basic model is typically generalized to risk-averse taxpayers. See
Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 12, at 324 (assuming that the taxpayer in
their model is risk averse).
62. Despite the fact that the overall audit rate for individuals is quite low,
the IRS estimates individuals’ voluntary compliance rate at 83.1%. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., IRS TAX GAP MAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006, http://www.
irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf. However, taxpayers lack the
opportunity to evade taxes on many sources of income because of information
reporting and withholding. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The
Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007)
(explaining that an important piece of the purported “puzzle” of high federal
income tax compliance “is that the federal income tax law benefits from
structural mechanisms that constrain payment with respect to the major
sources of income for many people, including wages and salaries”).
63. See Lederman, supra note 58, at 1467 (“Among other techniques, the
IRS uses a secret formula with a multitude of variables that is designed to
optimize the selection of returns for audit.” (citations omitted)); James Alm et
al., The Relationship Between State and Federal Tax Audits, in EMPIRICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD TAXATION 235, 236–37 (Martin Feldstein & James
M. Poterba eds., 2008) (explaining that states use varied audit selection
methodologies, including return characteristics).
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respond to audit rates. 64 More sophisticated tax compliance
models therefore treat the audit rate as endogenous, 65 such that
the probability of audit is a function of reported income and is
determined jointly with cheating as part of an equilibrium.
These traditional models also assume that if enforcement
were costless, it would be optimal to set the audit rate at 100% so
that taxpayers could not cheat. 66 Thus, the problem of optimizing
the audit rate only occurs in these models because in a costly
enforcement system, the government must determine how to
allocate its limited resources so as to maximize tax revenue. In
other words, traditional models presume that the substantive tax
laws are necessarily optimal, so the failure to achieve 100%
compliance is, on balance, a net social cost. As we explain in the
next section, this assumption is flawed.
B. Standard Accounts of the Effects of Uncertainty
In the poker winnings example discussed above, the audit
rate was clear and known to the taxpayer. 67 In reality, taxpayers
may face uncertainty regarding their likelihood of audit. 68 The
64. See Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 824 (“[T]axpayers may condition
their reports on past reports and audit experiences, as well as future
expectations.”).
65. See id. at 824–31 (reviewing models that treat the audit rate as
endogenously determined).
66. See, e.g., Erard & Feinstein, supra note 14, at 4 (“[W]e derive the tax
agency’s audit rule under the assumption that the agency seeks to maximize
expected tax and penalty revenue net of audit costs, subject to an explicit budget
constraint.”); Michael J. Graetz et al., The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an
Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6 (1986) (“In our
basic model, we assume that the IRS in its enforcement strategy attempts to
maximize total government revenue, including taxes, interests, and penalties,
net of audit costs.”); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement
and Evasion, 43 J. PUB. ECON. 221, 221–22 n.3 (1990) (“[T]his paper examines
the common case where, in principle, one would like to enforce fully the taxes
one imposes if enforcement were costless.”).
67. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 241, 258 (2013) (“The probability that a [tax] position will be struck
down . . . encompasses a number of probabilities—the chance of audit, the
chance of detection, and the chance that the position will be struck down—and
none of these probabilities is known.”); John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty,
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IRS publicizes general audit rates retrospectively 69 but closely
guards the factors that increase the likelihood that an individual
return will be audited. 70 Thus, taxpayers face uncertainty
regarding the probability that cheating will be detected, as well
as the probability of sanction. 71
Moreover, the poker winnings example implicitly assumed
that the tax law’s application was clear. In that simple example,
this assumption is realistic: the federal income tax
unambiguously encompasses winnings of this type. 72 Many other
tax liability questions are far less clear, however. In fact, the
government could choose to make the tax law intentionally
unclear in an effort to increase tax compliance. 73 Does legal
uncertainty increase tax compliance? 74 Existing literature
responds to this question in different ways.
Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 490, 497–98 (1995) (finding, in a 1988 study of taxpayers asked to
imagine understating income by $500 or $5,000, a mean perceived probability of
detection across the two questions of 48%, reflecting a wide variance of
answers).
69. The information available on the IRS website includes tables for 1998
through 2012 labeled “Examination Coverage: Recommended and Average
Recommended Additional Tax After Examination, by Type and Size of Return
and Fiscal Year.” See Examination Coverage: Recommended and Average
Recommended Additional Tax After Examination, by Type and Size of Return
and Fiscal Year (2013), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (last updated Mar. 25, 2013)
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Examination-Coverage:-Recommendedand-Average-Recommended-Additional-Tax-After-Examination-IRS-Data-BookTable-9a (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (listing general audit rates for past years) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See Raskolnikov, supra note 18, at 590 (“Audit strategies such as the
audit selection formulas are among the IRS’s most closely guarded secrets.”
(citations omitted)).
71. See Lawsky, supra note 68, at 258 (noting taxpayer uncertainty about
the likelihood the IRS will detect and penalize noncompliant reporting); Joel
Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency, 89
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 183, 185 (1987) (“The problem of tax evasion is
inherently one of choice under uncertainty . . . .”).
72. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle,
gross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”).
73. See Osofsky, supra note 15, at 494 (explaining that the application of
both tax rules and standards can be uncertain).
74. In this Article, we use the term “uncertainty” in its broad sense to refer
to unknown outcomes, encompassing both known and unknown probability
distributions. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT

ENFORCEMENT AS SUBSTANCE

1695

1. The Effects of Uncertainty on Risk-Averse Taxpayers
An important line of literature argues that uncertainty can
foster tax compliance. Some of this literature focuses on unclear
substantive law, arguing that taxpayers facing uncertain tax
consequences from a completed transaction are likely to report
more income. 75 Kyle Logue explains the intuition as follows:
[G]iven the existing incentives to under-comply with the tax
laws, maybe the deterrence value of a little legal uncertainty
will at least help to even things out. Indeed, the only thing
preventing some taxpayers from being more aggressive in
their tax planning may be the residual level of uncertainty
within the tax laws. And this might even be Congress’s intent;
lawmakers may have left some uncertainties in the tax laws
with the hope in mind that taxpayers, seeking to avoid
uncertainty, would err on the side of caution. 76

Similar reasoning applies in the context of tax enforcement.
Namely, a risk-averse taxpayer has a greater incentive to comply
with the law to avoid a penalty in an uncertain regime than in a
certain one. For example, Suzanne Scotchmer and Joel Slemrod
“show in a simple model that with the probability of audit and

19–20, 197–232 (1921). Where known uncertainty (“risk” in the Knightian
sense) leads to results in our model different from unknown uncertainty
(“uncertainty” in the Knightian sense, sometimes referred to in the literature as
“ambiguity”), we distinguish the two concepts. Otherwise, we treat them as one
category for ease of exposition.
Moreover, unlike some economists, we do not limit the notion of increased
uncertainty or risk to situations involving distributions of greater variance but
the same mean—that is, a “mean-preserving spread”—of the variable of
interest. See Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Increasing Risk: I. A
Definition, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 225, 231 (1970) (“The concept of a [meanpreserving spread] is the beginning . . . of a definition of greater variability.”).
Here, we are concerned with the tax enforcement agency’s ability to adjust
enforcement rates up or down for certain classes of taxpayers in order to tailor
enforcement. See infra Parts III–IV.
75. See Osofsky, supra note 15, at 500–01 (“[I]f taxpayers believe that . . .
the Service will audit more frequently in response to strategic uncertainty . . .
[t]axpayers may respond by reporting higher tax liability in order to avoid a
higher perceived chance of audit and resulting costs . . . .”).
76. Logue, supra note 15, at 374 (citations omitted).
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fines fixed, randomness in assessed taxable income generally
enhances revenue” when taxpayers are risk averse. 77
Laurence Weiss relied on the same basic risk-aversion
assumption to find that random taxation (which gives rise to
uncertainty for taxpayers) is socially beneficial in a world in
which lump sum taxation—in other words, taxing everyone the
same amount regardless of income—is not feasible, so income is
taxed instead. 78 Weiss’s model adapts the traditional model of tax
compliance by allowing taxpayers to choose how much labor to
supply to the market in addition to choosing how much to cheat
on their taxes. 79 Weiss’s advance is in recognizing that cheating
may reduce the distortions resulting from the diminution in labor
resulting from an income tax. 80 Moreover, if the penalty is set
appropriately, risk-averse taxpayers can be deterred from
excessive cheating, so that overall welfare increases. 81
Building upon the models of Weiss and others, 82 Frank
Cowell argued that “[n]o coherent reason [has been] advanced as
77. Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement,
38 J. PUB. ECON. 17, 18 (1989) (footnote omitted). Their model assumes a linear
tax rate and, as is standard, the imposition of a penalty when an audit reveals
underreporting, but no “reward” if the audit reveals overreporting. Id. at 20.
Their model and similar ones inherently require the assumption of taxpayer
risk aversion. See id. (assuming a risk averse taxpayer); Baldry, supra note 21,
at 157, 158 (same); Cowell, supra note 21, at 181 (same); Graetz et al., supra
note 66, at 12 (same); Weiss, supra note 15, at 1343 (same).
78. Weiss, supra note 15, at 1343–44 (“[S]tarting from a position in which
no one cheats, it is to the advantage of all agents to have incentives to cheat,
while these incentives might be provided without any loss of (expected) tax
revenues.”).
79. See id. (permitting taxpayers to choose how much labor to supply).
80. See id. (discussing the economic benefits of noncompliance); Shlomo
Yitzhaki, On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion, 15 PUB. FIN. Q. 123, 123 (1987)
(“Weiss (1976) has recently challenged the popular view, suggesting that
societies may actually benefit from allowing the taxpayer to cheat.”).
81. Yitzhaki argues that the welfare gains from encouraging taxpayer
cheating will not “increase[] welfare beyond what will be achieved by an optimal
tax rate” adopted in the substantive law. Yitzhaki, supra note 80, at 134.
82. Cowell builds upon the work of J.C. Baldry, who in turn builds upon
Serge-Christophe Kolm’s model. See Baldry, supra note 21, at 156–57 (arguing
that when the marginal cost of enforcement is positive, less than full
enforcement may result in a budget surplus when taxpayers are risk-averse);
Kolm, supra note 21, at 265–70 (suggesting, in a response to Allingham and
Sandmo, that allowing some tax evasion could increase overall utility for risk-

ENFORCEMENT AS SUBSTANCE

1697

to why one [would be] interested in eliminating tax evasion in the
first place.” 83 Like Weiss, Cowell adopts a model in which riskaverse taxpayers select how much to engage in tax evasion and
how much labor to supply, but Cowell also models how the
“effective expected real wage” from labor changes when the
government alters its audit strategy. 84 Cowell concludes that “the
impact on Social Welfare of an increase in detection probability is
in general not clear cut even if there were no marginal costs . . . .
So the government may be able to increase social welfare . . . by
actually encouraging dishonesty.”85 Like Weiss’s model, Cowell’s
work is an important recognition that the government may
reduce deadweight losses from taxation by encouraging
noncompliance, but it is limited to circumstances involving riskaverse taxpayers. 86
2. The Effects of Uncertainty on Risk-Neutral Taxpayers
In line with the discussion above, Joseph Stiglitz developed a
compliance model involving a consumption tax and found that
random tax rates are generally the government’s best approach. 87
averse taxpayers). Because Cowell’s model is a more complete exposition of
Baldry’s and Kolm’s earlier models, for simplicity, we refer to the group of them
as “Cowell’s model” in the remainder of the article. See infra notes 83–86 and
accompanying text; Frank A. Cowell, Public Policy and Tax Evasion: Some
Problems, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY 273 (Wulf Gaertner &
Alois Wenig eds., 1985) (making a claim similar to Baldry’s regarding imperfect
enforcement).
83. Cowell, supra note 21, at 181.
84. Id. at 181–82; see also Cowell, supra note 82.
85. Cowell, supra note 21, at 182–83. But see Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra
note 74, at 188 n.5 (arguing that Cowell’s analysis is incorrect because he
mistakenly concluded that a term in his equation must be less than zero, a
critical component of his conclusion that welfare falls as the probability of
detection and penalty rises).
86. See Cowell, supra note 21, at 168 (making the assumption that the
taxpayer’s utility function is concave for consumption); Cowell, supra note 82, at
275 (noting the second derivative of the utility function is negative); Laura
Schechter, Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Exercise,
35 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 67, 67 (2007) (“According to expected-utility theory, risk
aversion arises due to the concavity of the utility function.”).
87. See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 9, 15 (“The larger the revenue to be
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His model, like Weiss’s, assumes risk-averse taxpayers. 88
However, F.R. Chang and D.E. Wildasin extended the Stiglitz
model to risk-neutral taxpayers. 89 They confirmed Stiglitz’s
finding that randomizing the tax on a consumption good is
generally optimal. 90 However, instead of using a utilitymaximizing approach, they adopted an expenditure-minimization
model in which overall consumer expenditures are minimized for
a desired level of utility. 91 Like Stiglitz—and unlike the model we
present below—Chang and Wildasin focus on randomizing tax
rates, rather than enforcement. 92
raised . . . and the more negative the curvature of the demand function, the
more likely is random taxation to be desirable.”); see also James Alm, Uncertain
Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 237–42
(1988) (elaborating on Stiglitz’s model and finding that increasing declared
income in the presence of uncertainty depends on absolute and relative levels of
taxpayer risk aversion); Wojciech Kopczuk, Redistribution When Avoidance
Behavior is Heterogeneous, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 51, 65 (2001) (“As long as [tax]
avoidance is more easily accessible to individuals to whom one wants to
redistribute income, its existence may be welfare improving.”); Wolfram F.
Richter & Robin W. Boadway, Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax Evasion 18
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 505, 2001), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=277282 (examining the potentially beneficial results of
noncompliance for risk-averse taxpayers).
88. See Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Income Tax Compliance
in a Principal-Agent Framework, 26 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 13 (1985) (“Stiglitz (1976)
and Weiss (1976) have suggested that randomness in the tax or audit rates may
have beneficial incentive effects when labor supply decisions are endogenous
and individuals are risk averse.”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The
Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON.
REV. 880, 884–85 (1979) (examining the effects of fines on risk-averse
individuals).
89. See F.R. Chang & D.E. Wildasin, Randomization of Commodity Taxes:
An Expenditure Minimization Approach, 31 J. PUB. ECON. 329, 330, 342 (1987)
(explaining that their model, unlike Stiglitz’s, does not depend on taxpayer risk
aversion, though it also involves two identical consumers).
90. See id. at 344 (“[W]e have found necessary and sufficient conditions for
randomization of the tax structure to be Pareto improving, if accompanied by
lump-sum interpersonal transfers.”).
91. See id. at 330, 342 (explaining that their model, unlike Stiglitz’s, does
not depend on taxpayer risk aversion).
92. See id. at 330 (“[W]e present and interpret necessary and sufficient
conditions for a small move toward a random tax structure, i.e. ‘local
randomization’, to be desirable.”); Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 4 (“[W]e provide
conditions in which a slight randomization in the tax rate would lead to Pareto
improvement (in terms of ex ante expected utility).”). The same holds true for
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Jennifer Reinganum and Louis Wilde developed a model in
which risk-neutral taxpayers are uncertain about enforcement
costs and therefore uncertain about how much of an
understatement will trigger an audit.93 In their model, the IRS
maximizes its revenue after enforcement costs, so it will tolerate
cheating where the net return on enforcing the laws against a
particular taxpayer will not be positive. 94 Reinganum and Wilde
found that, in their model, increasing enforcement uncertainty
increases compliance at first, but unless penalties are sufficiently
high—greater than 100%—after a certain point, increased
uncertainty will decrease compliance. 95 That model therefore
considers the effects of uncertainty on risk-neutral taxpayers, but
it follows the traditional approach of trying to maximize taxpayer
compliance. 96
Alm’s model, which elaborates upon Stiglitz’s model. Alm, supra note 87, at
237–44. Additionally, like Stiglitz, Chang and Wildasin assume that the two
taxpayers in the model are identical in terms of their revenue, demand, and
utility curves, limiting their model’s applicability. See Chang & Wildasin, supra
note 89, at 332–33 (describing the initial conditions for their chosen model
including “identical compensated demand curves for each household evaluated
at a common level of utility”); Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 5 (“Assume, for
simplicity, there are two identical individuals.”).
93. See Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, A Note on Enforcement
Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance, 4 Q.J. ECON. 793, 795 (1988) (assuming
taxpayer uncertainty about IRS enforcement costs).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 797. Isabel Sánchez and Joel Sobel also developed a model
involving risk-neutral taxpayers, focusing on the relationship between the
government as the principal and the IRS as the agent conducting the audits. See
Isabel Sánchez & Joel Sobel, Hierarchical Design and Enforcement of Income
Tax Policies, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 345, 345–46 (1993) (emphasizing the conflict
between the tax policy maker and the auditor). However, like Reinganum and
Wilde’s model, Sánchez and Sobel assume a revenue-maximization enforcement
strategy, rather than focusing on maximizing social utility. Id. at 349. Border
and Sobel adopt a similar principal–agent model, in which the government is
the principal and risk-neutral taxpayers are the agents. See Kim C. Border &
Joel Sobel, Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder, 54 REV.
ECON. STUD. 525, 525–29 (1987) (utilizing a principal–agent model). Again,
however, the model is limited to a revenue-maximization enforcement strategy.
See id.; see also Suzanne Scotchmer, Audit Classes and Tax Enforcement Policy,
77 AM. ECON. REV. 229 (1987) (also assuming a revenue-maximization strategy).
While a study by Mookherjee and Png extends these models to situations
involving a fixed revenue goal of the enforcement agency, it assumes risk-averse
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A significant departure from all of these models is a
relatively obscure article by Urs Schweizer, published in a
German economics journal, addressing whether tax evasion can
increase social welfare. 97 Like the Chang–Wildasin and
Reinganum–Wilde models, Schweizer considers risk-neutral
taxpayers, specifically importers that are subject to excise
taxes. 98 However, contrary to the usual assumption of revenuemaximization, Schweizer assumes that the government only has
a fixed revenue target in order “to finance some public projects.” 99
Schweizer’s model divides up importers into two classes: tax
evaders and non-evaders.100 In one scenario, the evaders and nonevaders sell the same goods and have the same cost structure, but
the evaders must expend resources in order to avoid detection by
the taxing authorities. 101 Schweizer shows that when evasion is
costly and the demand elasticities—the change in consumer
demand when prices go up or down—are identical, then perfect
enforcement is optimal because evasion costs give rise to
deadweight losses resulting from the fact that some consumers
are precluded from purchasing the product they would have
bought absent costly evasion. 102 However, in Schweizer’s second
scenario, the evaders and non-evaders have different cost
structures, making less-than-perfect (and, hence, uncertain)
enforcement optimal when the evaders sell at a lower marginal
taxpayers. See Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and
Redistribution, 104 Q.J. ECON. 399, 400–01 (1989).
97. Urs Schweizer, Welfare Analysis of Excise Tax Evasion, 140
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 247 (1984).
98. See id. at 247.
99. See id. (“Suppose the government needs a certain amount of resources
to finance some public projects and taxing imports is the only feasible source for
raising revenues.”); cf. Dilip Mookherjee & I.P.L. Png, Enforcement Costs and
the Optimal Progressivity of Income Tax, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 411, 412 (1990)
(“[T]he planner seeks to maximize social welfare subject to raising some target
revenue.”).
100. Schweizer, supra note 97, at 248.
101. Id. at 248–53; cf. Cowell, supra note 21, at 183 (“[E]vasion activities
might per se imply higher marginal costs of production because of all the tedious
business of having to hide the stuff when the King’s Men call.”). Note that
Cowell’s observation suggests that tax-evading sellers would never have lower
marginal costs than non-evading sellers.
102. See Schweizer, supra note 97, at 248–53 (modeling this approach).
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cost than the non-evaders and demand is income-inelastic,
meaning that consumer demand does not change as consumer
income increases or decreases.103
Schweizer’s work, although scarcely cited in later literature,
is important in two respects. First, Schweizer, like Weiss and
Cowell, contemplates that limiting enforcement may have
beneficial welfare effects. 104 Second, Schweizer considers the
context in which the government sets a specific revenue target,
rather than simply trying to maximize revenue, 105 which is more
reflective of how governments should behave when attempting to
maximize social welfare. 106
However, Schweizer’s model is limited in two key ways,
making its application relatively limited (and perhaps explaining
why it has not been heavily cited). First, because Schweizer’s
starting point is an examination of the conclusion in an earlier
article by Jagdish Bhwagati and Bent Hansen that evading
import tariffs reduces welfare, 107 Schweizer limits his exposition
to excise taxes and makes little effort to generalize his results,
even conceptually. 108

103. See id. at 257 (“If . . . marginal costs of non-evaders at an output level
sufficiently high exceed those of evaders operating at a level moderate enough,
the optimal policy has to allow for at least some tax evasion.”).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 248, 253–56 (using a revenue target in the analysis).
106. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF
PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at
33 (Comm. Print 1999), http://www.jct.gov/s-3-99.pdf
The government’s policy objective . . . is to maximize ‘social welfare.’
With respect to taxes, its objective is to design a tax system that
raises the desired amount of revenues in an equitable and efficient
manner, taking into consideration the likely response of the public to
the policies it adopts.
107. See Schweizer, supra note 97, at 247 (discussing Jagdish Bhagwati &
Bent Hansen, A Theoretical Analysis of Smuggling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 172 (1973),
and noting that the analysis presented in the remainder of his article relies on a
different assumption about the government’s revenue goal).
108. See id. at 248 (“The present paper deals with welfare problems arising
from evading—to differentiate our product from Sandmo’s—excise instead of
income taxes by an admittedly less general approach.”).
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Second, and more importantly, the only context Schweizer
identifies in which some evasion increases welfare requires an
artificial, exogenous distinction between evaders and non-evaders
that effectively begs the question of whether less-than-perfect
enforcement is optimal. 109 Specifically, Schweizer finds that if, at
a sufficiently high output level, evaders have lower marginal
costs in producing the goods, then—particularly if product
demand is income-inelastic—allowing some evasion is optimal. 110
That is, if evaders have a lower marginal cost structure, it is
socially optimal to shift some purchasing to them from the nonevaders because that will, by definition, increase producer
surplus (effectively, profits), some of which the government can
capture via penalties that counterbalance any lost taxes that
otherwise would have been paid up front by the non-evaders. 111
The principal problem with this approach is that it depends
on tax evaders having lower marginal cost curves than nonevaders. One generally would not expect that to be the case. 112 If
we imagine the producers of a certain product arrayed along the
spectrum of their marginal cost curves, we would not expect to
see those with the lowest marginal costs choosing to evade taxes
while the others do not. In reality, an economic decision to engage
in tax evasion is made in the context of whether the benefits of
doing so outweigh the costs. 113 Moreover, if the market is
competitive, those with higher marginal costs risk being put out
of business because the market price is below their cost. The
producers with higher marginal cost curves may therefore be
more likely to choose to engage in tax evasion.
It might be possible, however, that a seller’s decision to evade
taxes drives down its costs of production—if the taxes evaded are
not just the excise tax in question but taxes on inputs, too, such
as employment taxes owed with respect to workers and taxes due
on capital inputs. That is, by paying workers cash and buying
109. See id. at 253–54 (assuming without explanation that the evaders’
marginal costs are constant but the non-evaders’ marginal costs are strictly
increasing).
110. See id. at 257.
111. See id. at 254–55.
112. See supra note 101.
113. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
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inputs on the black market, a dishonest producer might succeed
in lowering its costs.114 Of course, the good produced with black
market inputs might not be a perfect substitute for the good
others are selling, 115 and the model requires that. 116 But even if
the resulting good is identical, the cheating producer’s lower costs
were produced through evasion of other taxes, begging the
question of whether perfectly enforcing those taxes is optimal or
welfare-reducing. Schweizer’s model does not consider this
possibility. In addition, Schweizer abstracts away from the
allocative distortions of taxation by analyzing sales of the same
good with demand that is income-inelastic. Thus, while
Schweizer’s work is important in that it recognizes that there
may be welfare benefits to imperfect tax enforcement, the context
he applies it to is narrow and not particularly realistic. 117

114. See Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View,
58 NAT’L TAX J. 643, 653 (2005) (“When firms and consumers hire black market
labor, it must be because it is cheaper; gross wages must be lower than in the
regular economy.”).
115. See id. (explaining that goods produced in the “below-ground” economy
(B) are not perfect substitutes for goods produced in the “above-ground”
economy (A): “Even where the A and B sectors appear to produce the ‘same’ good
or service, consumers will often prefer A’s output on account of better
reputation, follow-up service, warranty or return policy, lower search costs, and
the like”).
116. See Schweizer, supra note 97, at 257 (“[T]he analysis is restricted to the
case of two commodities to be distinguished only with respect to whether they
are legally exchanged or sold by tax evading suppliers. For buyers, the two
commodities are perfect substitutes.”).
117. Without citing Schweizer’s article, Carl Davidson, Lawrence Martin,
and John Douglas Wilson present a similar model, in an effort to answer the
question of whether the welfare benefits of allowing some tax evasion or the
allocative distortions resulting from evasion dominate. See Carl Davidson et al.,
Efficient Black Markets?, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1575, 1589–90 (2007) (not listing
Schweizer among the references). Like Schweizer’s, the Davidson et al. model is
of limited generalizability. Its finding that only if the black market consists of
high-quality goods is its existence welfare-enhancing depends upon a complex
interaction among product quality, consumer tastes, capital inputs, and a
penalty that depends partly upon retained capital (rather than revenue or
income). See id. at 1582–84 (discussing the assumptions and outcomes of their
model). The Davidson et al. article is discussed further below. See infra Part
IV.B.5.
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3. The Possibility that Uncertainty Decreases Tax Compliance
Contrary to the models discussed above, which generally
predict that uncertainty will increase tax compliance, Leigh
Osofsky has countered that uncertainty in the substantive tax
law may decrease tax revenues. 118 To be certain, the models
discussed above concerned uncertainty in enforcement, not in the
substantive tax law, and most of Osofsky’s arguments therefore
do not apply in the enforcement context. 119 One of her arguments,
however, does. 120 Specifically, Osofsky argues that “strategic
uncertainty may cause taxpayers to perceive ambiguity, rather
than [knowable] risk, regarding particular tax issues.” 121 Osofsky
118. See Osofsky, supra note 15, at 493 (“Tax law uncertainty, in this
context, means any type of tax law question that a taxpayer cannot definitively
resolve based on the available tax law authority.”).
119. First, Osofsky argues that the amount of tax penalties imposed
systematically declines as legal uncertainty increases because most tax
penalties do not apply if the taxpayer is not negligent or otherwise has a basis
for the position taken on the return. Id. at 508–11. Of course, when there is
certainty in the law, but uncertainty in enforcement, the taxpayer has no basis
to argue its noncompliance was non-negligent. Second, she contends that even if
increased uncertainty led taxpayers to fear an increased chance of audit, some
taxpayers might report less in an effort to gain in negotiations with the IRS over
the tax liability. Id. This argument, however, relies on the taxpayer gaining a
plausible basis for underreporting from uncertainty in the substantive law:
Under tax law uncertainty, . . . the taxpayer faces much less strategic
downside from reporting less tax liability, and instead may
experience much upside as a negotiation tactic . . . . If the Service
questions a low tax liability report, but the report remains within the
confines of the tax law, the Service has little leverage to demand a
higher payment.
Id. at 533. Last, Osofsky contends that uncertainty may increase the use of tax
return preparers, who have been shown to decrease compliance for questions
involving legal uncertainty. Id. at 535–36. Here again, Osofsky notes that it is
uncertainty “in the tax law” that drives taxpayers to resort to preparers (as well
as preparers’ aggressive positions); uncertain enforcement would not have that
effect. See id. at 537 (“Strategic uncertainty may provide the professional tax
return preparers who taxpayers may increasingly employ more ample ground
for exploitation of uncertain tax law.”).
120. Another argument is relevant—namely, that uncertainty in the law
may “seem[] fundamentally unfair,” which may cause some taxpayers to “shirk[]
their taxpaying obligations to a greater extent.” Id. at 524. We address this
argument below. See infra Part IV.B.5.
121. See Osofsky, supra note 15, at 492.
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suggests that in the face of ambiguity, taxpayers “who view their
chances of success as low under certain tax law, may welcome the
chance to take a gamble when the likelihood of disallowance of
the favorable tax position becomes less certain.” 122 In this event,
ambiguity will increase the overall level of dishonesty. 123
We agree with Osofsky that to the extent that some
taxpayers are ambiguity-seeking, their compliance in the face of
uncertainty may decrease. However, uncertainty need not always
generate ambiguity—as Osofsky recognizes, uncertainty may
merely result in knowable risk. 124 Under enforcement schemes
that merely increase knowable risk, like the one we advocate
below, it is only those taxpayers that are truly risk preferring
that may decrease compliance. 125 Although some risk-preferring
taxpayers surely exist, those numbers are very likely low. 126
Thus, while Osofsky’s work is important in the context of
uncertain substantive tax law, it does not significantly affect the
analysis of the measured enforcement model we contemplate
here.

Taxpayers may have divergent reactions to increased ambiguity,
whereby taxpayers with a low chance of success on the merits would
be more likely to claim tax benefits, whereas taxpayers with a high
chance of success on the merits would have the opposite inclination.
As a result, the impact of strategic uncertainty on revenue becomes
unclear.
Id.
122. Id. at 504.
123. See id. at 505.
124. See id. at 503 (explaining that “risk exists when taxpayers face known
probabilities of particular outcomes. Risk may increase as the potential
outcomes (or their percentage likelihoods) change, but in any event the
probability of the potential outcomes remains known”).
125. Cf. Jeffrey Partlow, The Necessity of Complexity in the Tax System, 13
WYO. L. REV. 303, 315 (2013) (“The audit lottery and self-reporting nature of the
tax system permit aggressive taxpayers to test the system and take advantage
of ambiguity . . . .”).
126. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to RiskBearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879, 909 (2006)
(noting how risk-preferring investors are “rare”).
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III. A Novel Uncertain Tax Enforcement Model

As Part II demonstrated, existing models of tax compliance
are incomplete. The traditional models do not take uncertainty
into account and treat revenue-maximization as the goal. 127 The
risk-aversion models ignore the possibility that uncertainty may
also be beneficial for risk-neutral taxpayers. 128 The models
involving risk-neutral taxpayers adhere to the traditional
assumption of revenue-maximization or are limited in scope.
The revenue-maximization assumption on which many of the
models rest is particularly limiting because it focuses on
maximizing tax receipts without regard to the effect of the tax
laws on overall social welfare. It is well-known that taxation may
cause market distortions, resulting in deadweight losses. 129 For
example, income taxes may cause labor and productivity declines
because they keep individuals from capturing the full benefits of
their labor. 130 Similarly, taxes on returns to capital can reduce
127. See supra Part II.
128. Yitzhaki argues that one of Weiss’s examples actually relates to a riskneutral taxpayer, not a risk-averse taxpayer, as Weiss contends. See Yitzhaki,
supra note 80, at 134–35 (explaining how the risk-aversion assumption is
violated). However, Yitzhaki does so in the context of attempting to refute
Weiss’s claim that taxpayer “cheating” can increase social welfare, rather than
presenting a general model of how noncompliance among risk-neutral taxpayers
can increase welfare. See id. at 135 (“We were unable to find any other examples
that will confirm Weiss’s contention. The question of whether there exists an
example in which it is desirable to allow the taxpayer to cheat is still open.”).
129. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 159 (6th ed.
2011) (“[B]ecause taxes distort incentives, they cause markets to allocate
resources inefficiently.”); Joel B. Slemrod, The Economics of Taxing the Rich, in
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 3, 24
(Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000) (“[T]he tax system clearly induces people to
rearrange their behavior, and these changes are evidence of an unseen but real
cost of levying taxes.”).
130. See Hasen, supra note 36, at 1074 (“[T]he policymaker . . . must address
the problem that individuals substitute untaxed leisure for work when the
marginal income tax rate is high enough.”). A tax may also give rise to an
“income effect,” however, in which taxpayers compensate for their post-tax
decrease in consumption power by working more. See Linda Sugin, A
Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 233
(2011) (“Income effects look at how people manage their income in response to a
tax. For example, an orange lover might earn more money to afford the
expensive oranges that he craves.”). In Part IV, we consider the role of income
effects as they apply to our model.
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the incentive for investment, 131 and overall consumption may
decrease in the face of sales and use taxes. 132 Although decreased
market activity is sometimes the aim of these taxes—that is,
Pigouvian taxation 133—often, the primary focus is simply to raise
revenue. 134
In addition, all of these declines in market activity can be
associated with overall allocative distortions if market actors are
differentially affected by taxes, which is invariably the case. 135
For example, relatively inelastic goods, such as cigarettes, will be
subject to less decreased demand in the face of consumption taxes
than are relatively elastic goods, such as floral arrangements. 136
Taxes will thus not only decrease overall consumption for both of
these goods, but introduce allocative distortions relative to a free
market by reducing consumption of one good (here, flowers) more,
131. See JIM SAXTON, JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 10 (1997), available at http://
www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=fb9bda51-34e1-44ccbfad-2c82d2539ac7 (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) (“[T]here are many provisions in
the tax code which discriminate against saving and investment and outweigh
the preferential treatment of capital gains.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
132. See MANKIW, supra note 129, at 162 (“[T]ax raises the price paid by
buyers, so they consume less. At the same time, . . . tax lowers the price received
by sellers, so they produce less. Because of these changes in behavior, the size of
the market shrinks below the optimum.”).
133. See Tatiana Andreyeva et al., The Impact of Food Prices on
Consumption: A Systematic Review of Research on the Price Elasticity of
Demand for Food, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 216, 216 (2010),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2804646/pdf/216.pdf (“Experience
from tobacco tax regulation . . . underscores the power of price changes to
influence purchasing behavior and, ultimately, public health.”); see also supra
note 36.
134. See William B. Barker, International Tax Reform Should Begin at
Home: Replace the Corporate Income Tax with a Territorial Expenditure Tax, 30
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 647, 651 (2010) (“The first and most obvious function of
taxation is raising revenue. Today, with the ever-increasing problem of tax
competition, governments are looking for new, dependable sources of revenue.”
(footnotes omitted)).
135. See Kunio Kawamata, Price Distortion and Potential Welfare, 42
ECONOMETRICA 435, 435 (1974) (“If a government imposes sales taxes, or
subsidizes several industries and keeps some prices higher than others, there is
a distortion in the market mechanism, in the sense that not all of the agents in
the economy face or act on the same ratios.”).
136. See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
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in an applicable economic sense, than the consumption of another
good (here, tobacco).137
Accordingly, our model focuses on overall social utility rather
than simply looking to maximize tax collections regardless of the
social costs. Specifically, our model makes three significant
contributions to the literature. First, in contrast to all but a
handful of economic models, which have been largely ignored in
legal scholarship, 138 we show that—because of the distortionary
effects of taxation—it may be in the government’s interest to
intentionally induce some taxpayers not to comply with the tax
laws as they appear on the books. Second, we show that tax
uncertainty may yield social benefits even with respect to riskneutral taxpayers, particularly sellers of generic goods that
endogenously choose to comply (or not) with the tax laws. In
contrast to the few economic models finding noncompliance
socially beneficial even if taxpayers are risk neutral, our model
does not assume that perfect compliance is optimal or rely on
unrealistic assumptions about factors such as product quality. 139
Third, unlike the economics literature—which has essentially
limited its analysis of the potential efficiency benefits of
137. See Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines Jr., The Last Best Hope for
Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1054 (2010) (“Tax rates distort the
allocation of resources, which ought, in standard welfare economics theory, to be
set efficiently by the pretax price system.”).
138. On the Westlaw Law Review “JLR” database, a search for Weiss, supra
note 15, yields one citation (search for “The Desirability of Cheating Incentives
and Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax”); a search for Cowell, supra note
82, yields no citations (search for “Public Policy and Tax Evasion: Some
Problems” and “The Economics Of The Shadow Economy”); a search for Cowell,
supra note 21, yields four citations (search for “Frank A. Cowell” and “The
Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion”); a search for Schweizer, supra note 97,
yields no citations (search for “Welfare Analysis of Excise Tax Evasion” and “Urs
Schweizer”); and a search for Davidson et al., supra note 117, yields no citations
(search for “Efficient Black Markets?”; and “Carl Davidson”). Only one citing
reference notes the possibility that imperfect compliance may increase welfare,
and that article does so briefly, in a footnote. See Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing
Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV. 33, 39 n.25 (1994) (“[It] has been
suggested, however, that the possibility of successful evasion of tax on labor
income in the informal sector may operate as an informal (and desirable)
mechanism to reduce the economic distortion caused by a tax on labor in the
search for optimal taxation.” (citing Weiss, supra note 15)).
139. See supra notes 97–117 and accompanying text.
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noncompliance to quantitative models—we discuss at length the
policy concerns raised by a system of measured tax enforcement.
Our model of intentional reduction in tax compliance to
decrease the distortionary effects of taxation stands in stark
contrast to traditional legal solutions to this problem, which
include changes to the tax rate, allowable deductions and credits,
and the like. 140 Importantly, the traditional approaches all
involve certain and deterministic changes. On the other hand, our
proposal—drawing upon earlier work by one of us on intellectual
property 141—involves increasing the amount of uncertainty to
alter compliance rates in a structured way, thereby decreasing
economic distortions, while maintaining or increasing overall tax
revenue. 142

140. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The
Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 28 (2006) (arguing that
refundable credits constitute the “optimal subsidy” and “best way to minimize
the distortions that necessarily result from our inability to perfectly correct for
the externalities involved”); Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX
LAW. 549, 568 (2008) (contending that in contrast to a credit, a deduction may
“‘buy’ a reduction in the deadweight cost of taxation” by potentially decreasing
taxpayers’ effective marginal rate).
141. Ted Sichelman, Quantum Game Theory and Coordination in
Intellectual Property (San Diego Legal Studies Paper, No. 10-035, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656625. See also Ian Ayres & Paul
Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies,
97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (examining the benefits of uncertainty on patent
litigation).
142. Moreover, in the vein of Stiglitz, we extend our model to account for
allocative distortions caused by differential elasticities of supply or demand. See
infra Part III.B. Note that the uncertainty created by imperfect tax enforcement
can also be created by poorly defined statutes and regulations. See Louis
Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uniformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information
About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 93 (1990).
To the extent that these laws create uncertainty regarding the locus and
amount of a given tax, the same sorts of concerns arise as in the tax
enforcement context. This is not meant to imply that the two would have
identical effects, however. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 6, at 1010–11
(finding that enforcement uncertainty, while reducing the expected sanction,
results in less noncompliance than substantive law uncertainty, which
undercuts the law’s normative force). For instance, taxpayers might take more
offense at unequal treatment under the substantive tax law than the same
under an enforcement scheme, leading to different compliance results.
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A. Reducing Distortions from Decreased Demand

As discussed above, sales and other types of consumption
taxes can reduce the demand for products and services. 143 These
taxes will typically affect the demand for products with differing
elasticities differently. 144 These variable effects of taxes on
product demand can result in allocative inefficiencies that
outweigh any social benefits from taxation. 145 If it were costless
for the legislature or rulemaker to discriminate among various
classes of products, it could adopt differential (Ramsey-style) tax
rates based on product elasticity, collecting the same amount of
overall revenue but reducing the amount of allocative inefficiency
caused by a single rate. 146 However, in practice, the transaction
costs of doing so can be quite high, which typically results in a
single sales or other consumption tax rate applicable to all but a
few classes of products. 147
143. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
144. See Andreyeva et al., supra note 133, at 217 (“The price elasticity of
demand . . . is determined by a multitude of factors: availability of substitutes,
household income, consumer preferences, expected duration of price change, and
the product’s share of a household’s income.”).
145. See Lee Anne Fennell, Relative Burdens: Family Ties and the Safety
Net, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1453, 1513 (2004) (“Placing a tax on elastic items
can lead to significantly different consumption patterns that do the government
no good, but that leave the individual consumers worse off than they otherwise
would be. This is a deadweight loss.”).
146. See A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Structure of Indirect Taxation
97,
117
(1972),
and
Economic
Efficiency,
1
J. PUB. ECON.
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/Atkinson-Stiglitz_(JPubE72).pdf (“[T]he optimal
structure of taxation from an efficiency viewpoint is one that taxes more heavily
goods which have a low income elasticity of demand.”); Edward J. McCaffery, A
New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 850 (2005) (“The core insight
of the Ramsey optimal tax literature is the ‘inverse elasticity’ rule. The
government should tax goods in inverse proportion to their price-elasticities.”).
See generally Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37
ECON. J. 47 (1927).
147. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-2.5-2-2(a) (2011) (“The state gross retail
tax is measured by the gross retail income received by a retail merchant in a
retail unitary transaction and is imposed at seven percent (7%) of that gross
retail income.”); id. § 6-2.5-5 (containing certain exemptions including food,
water, and public transportation); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6051 (West 2011)
(“For the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail a tax is hereby
imposed upon all retailers . . . .”); id. §§ 6381–6396 (listing exemptions).
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Here, we introduce a model of intentionally imperfect and
uncertain enforcement that can reduce overall allocative
inefficiencies resulting from sales and similar taxes, while
maintaining or increasing overall tax revenue. We apply it to an
example of a highly elastic product, whereby the sales tax reduces
demand for the product so much that sellers of the product
cannot sell the product at a profit. This drives the sellers out of
the market, which not only introduces market inefficiencies, but
also reduces or eliminates tax revenue from the sellers. 148 If the
government introduces imperfect and uncertain enforcement in
collecting sales tax on the product, sellers can effectively “cheat,”
allowing them to set their prices so as to sell the product
profitably. The resumption of sales reduces allocative distortions
and increases government revenue. Importantly, although we
apply our model to sales taxes, the model can be generalized to
apply to other taxes, such as income taxes, that reduce overall
demand or productivity. 149

148. Specifically, taxes might be reduced—but not eliminated—if sellers
entered other, less profitable markets, leading to some, but less, taxable
revenue.
149. Specifically, income taxes can provide incentives for taxpayers to
substitute leisure for labor. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Behavioral Responses to
Proposed High-Income Tax Rate Increases: An Evaluation of the Feldstein–
Feenberg Study, 59 TAX NOTES 1097, 1100 (1993) (“When the wage rate falls,
leisure becomes less costly in terms of forgone wages, and the individual might
wish to increase leisure by reducing the amount of time worked.”); Edward J.
McCaffery & James R. Hines Jr., The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83
S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1054–55 (2010) (“Looking at wages, or the payment for
labor, taxes on them cause after-tax wages to fall, and so people find work less
attractive. This tax-induced distortion causes taxpayers to substitute untaxed
leisure for taxed labor, all else equal.”). Some taxpayers will be more inclined to
stop working in the face of an income tax increase than others—in other words,
the labor elasticity for some taxpayers will be higher than other taxpayers—
which, like sales taxes, can result in allocative distortions. See BENJAMIN M.
FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING 242–44 (1988) (explaining that an individual’s
response to after-tax wage variances depends on a variety of individual
characteristics). In some cases, labor elasticity may be so high that a taxpayer
substitutes so much leisure activity that the net tax revenue from the taxpayer
is less than before the increase. Under these conditions, the model we present
below for sales taxes can be adapted to income taxes. Similar treatments apply
for other types of taxes that reduce productive, taxable market activity.
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For example, suppose that the sales tax rate is 10% of a
product’s pre-tax price. 150 Also suppose that the tax produces no
net social benefits or losses. 151 In other words, the administration
of the tax system is assumed to be costless, and the value to
society of the system is assumed to be exactly equal to the value
of the money in the hands of the taxpayers. 152 Also assume that
in a system of perfect enforcement, non-compliers are always
caught, and it is costless for the government to do so. When
caught, taxpayers must pay the tax, plus a penalty of 50% of
whatever is owed. 153
With no tax, product A would be sold at $100, with three
consumers purchasing it. 154 One consumer would pay a maximum
(i.e., has a reservation price) of $108 for the product, another
consumer would pay $104, and the last consumer, $100. 155
Assume that there is no possible price discrimination and the
market is a competitive one, such that the seller earns no profit
150. For simplicity, in this and the remainder of the examples, we assume
no other taxes or subsidies apply.
151. Of course, there is reason to believe that taxation can produce net social
benefits, which strengthens the argument we present here. See Diane Lim
Rogers, Opinion, Good Reasons for Taxes, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2006, available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2006/04/16taxes-rogers
(last
visited Sept. 30, 2013) (“[E]ven with our imperfect tax system, the revenues
provided by taxes strengthen, not weaken, our nation’s economy. They fund
essential public goods and services, they contribute positively to national saving
and many of the things that they fund . . . indirectly create private wealth as
well.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
152. We adopt the equal utility assumption for simplicity. Under this
assumption, our example shows that probabilistic enforcement results in a net
utility equal to that of no tax. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
However, if we relax this assumption such that positive externalities result from
taxation, then probabilistic taxation can exceed the benefits of no tax. See id.
153. In general, let the pre-tax price of the product be P, the sales tax rate r,
and the penalty rate, t. In this situation, the expected tax payment in the event
of evasion and detection is Pr + Prt = Pr(1 + t).
154. In general, the price of the product will be a function of the demand
curve and supply curve. For simplicity, assume a fixed producer cost C
(including opportunity costs) for each product, and a competitive market
wherein all producers have the same per-product cost, C, such that the product
price, P, is equal to C in the absence of a tax.
155. In general, assume the reserve price for each consumer is defined as Pr
(reserve price) = C + dn, where dn is the marginal demand for the nth consumer
over the producer cost, C.
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when selling at $100. In that case, social welfare with no tax is
$12 (all consumer surplus), because the first and second
consumers value the product at $8 and $4 more than the
purchase price, respectively. 156
With the 10% tax in place, there is no price at which the
seller can break even and sell the product. 157 Specifically, if the
seller set the pre-tax price sufficiently below $100 to capture at
least one customer once the 10% tax is included, it would not
break even, because $100 is the lowest price at which the seller
can earn a profit. 158 Assuming it is relatively costless for the
seller to enter a new line of business with a similar amount of
risk, then it would do so—otherwise, the seller would simply go
out of business entirely—and, in either event, product A would
not be sold. Thus, with a tax, social welfare is 0, with a
deadweight loss of $12. 159

156. In general, with no tax, social welfare would be
, where there are
N consumers.
157. In general, with a tax rate r, since the producer’s cost per product is
fixed at C, the post-tax product price becomes P(1+r), or C(1+r). In this event,
any consumer for which C + dn < C(1+ r) (i.e., dn < Cr) will not purchase the
product. Suppose there are K consumers for which this holds. In this event,
assuming the utility of the tax is the same in the government’s hands as the
consumers’, then net social welfare is reduced by
, relative to no tax, from
those consumers who do not purchase the product. We assume here that these K
consumers gain essentially no utility from other uses. See infra note 159.
158. We have implicitly assumed that in the event of a tax, the lowest price
at which the seller may earn a profit is $110 (in other words, consumers bear
the total incidence of the tax). Of course, the government could use the tax to
increase the wealth of one or more buyers, or to subsidize the sellers, to offset
the decreased demand from the sales tax. As we mentioned, these alternatives
are examples of traditional solutions to tax distortions and are typically difficult
to implement. Here, we make the realistic assumption that these solutions are
not feasible, in order to demonstrate the full benefits of probabilistic
enforcement.
159. If consumers do not purchase product A, they are left with disposable
income to purchase another product, make an investment, and so forth. We
assume for simplicity that all other products of interest to the consumer are
produced in a competitive market and taxed at the same 10% rate. If this is so,
then the consumer would not purchase any of these products for the same
reasons presented in the text. Thus, the consumer must invest or save the
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Although the tax collector cannot change the tax rate for
product A, it can change its enforcement strategy. Suppose the
tax collector enforces the tax only x% of the time. In that case, if
the seller does not pay sales tax up front, its expected tax
payment is 0.15Px (i.e., 10% of the purchase price, P, plus a 50%
penalty of that amount times x%). 160 When the expected tax
payment in the event of detected noncompliance is less than the
certain amount of payment up front, i.e., when 0.15Px < 0.10P, 161
money not spent. This would lead to some net surplus, as well some government
revenue, but for ease of exposition, we assume without loss of generality that
the combined surplus and tax revenue would be essentially nil. For instance, in
the example of above, if a consumer saves $100, suppose on average the
consumer makes a 5% return by investing the money. Assuming for simplicity
the same 10% tax rate as the sales tax, this results in $0.50 of government tax
revenue. The return also generates consumer surplus of $5, but recall that we
ignored in our example any investment surplus made by the seller and the
government. Assuming that the seller and government would have similar
returns to the consumer, the net surplus from the consumer’s investment
relative to that when the product is sold would be close to zero. Thus, any
discretionary cash left in the consumer’s hands generally would not
substantially affect overall welfare. Moreover, any use of the cash by the
consumer would always, by definition, be an inferior choice relative to
purchasing the product. In Part III.B, below, we examine a situation in which
consumers purchase an alternative, less desirable product in the face of a sales
tax.
160. In general, the net expected tax payment is Prx(1 + t), where P is the
price of the good, r is sales tax rate, x the probability of detection, and t the tax
penalty. Thus, in the example in the text, the net expected tax payment is
P(0.10)(1+0.5)x = 0.15Px.
161. In general, when Prx(1+t) < Pr (i.e, x(1+t) < 1), then a risk-neutral seller
will not remit sales tax to the government up front. In other words, when x <
1/(1 + t), a seller will not remit sales tax to the government up front. When a
seller is risk-averse, this will decrease the number of sellers who will engage in
“tax evasion.” See generally notes 49–81 and accompanying text. In a simple
model of risk aversion, this can be modeled by multiplying the quantity x(1+t) by
a seller risk multiplier Rs, such that Rs > 1. Conversely, when sellers are riskpreferring, this will increase the number of sellers willing to engage in tax
evasion, which can be modeled by multiplying the quantity x(1+t) by a seller
risk-multiplier Rs, such that Rs < 1. In other words, for any risk profile, when x <
1/Rs(1+t), then a seller will evade taxes. In effect, in a simple model of risk
aversion, seller risk aversion will increase the effective audit rate, and seller
risk preference will decrease the effective audit rate. For simplicity, we ignore
the seller’s risk profile in the remaining analysis, but given its basic effect on
outcome, it is clear that our general results do not depend on the risk profile of
the seller. Rather, they either strengthen (in the case of risk-averse taxpayers)
or weaken (in the case of risk-preferring taxpayers) our general finding that
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a risk-neutral seller will not remit sales tax to the tax collector. 162
In other words, when x < 2/3—that is, when the enforcement rate
is less than 66.66%—a risk-neutral seller will earn more on
average by “cheating.”
Notably, when the enforcement rate is less than 66.66%, the
seller may be able to price the good more cheaply in order to
induce buyers to purchase it. Specifically, the seller may be able
to nominally set P below 100, because it can now keep part of the
amount of nominal tax that it collects from the buyer, which can
offset losses otherwise caused by pricing below cost. 163
Specifically, the net expected profit for the seller is (1.1P – 100)N
– 0.15PN, where N is the number of units sold. 164 The first term
reflects the net profits before taxes—the price of the good P plus
the 10% nominal tax (i.e., 1.1P) less the cost to the seller to make
each good (i.e., $100), multiplied by the number of units sold. The
second term reflects the net expected tax payment calculated
earlier, which thereby reduces the seller’s net expected profits. 165
If the seller can break even, then it will sell the product. In
other words, for any N, if (1.1P – 100) – 0.15Px   WKHQ LWZLOO
sell. 166 Thus, if P(1.1 – 0.15x it will sell. The government
knows that the seller effectively has three pricing options
limited enforcement can increase utility.
162. We have assumed the seller knows the enforcement rate, as we discuss
in Part IV.
163. In this regard, note that the seller will always prefer to charge a tax
and not remit it to the alternative of not charging a tax at all, because if the
seller does the former, it ultimately pays less in tax and penalties when tax is
collected, because the effective price of the good is lower in the former case.
164. In general, the net expected profit for the seller when it forgoes paying
sales tax up front is M([(1+r)P – C] – Prx(1 + t)), where M is the number of
consumers purchasing the product. Collecting terms, the net expected profit is
M[P(1 + r(1 – x – xt)) – C].
165. Here, we assume that the nominal price, P, is respected by the tax
collector, because the government has intentionally adopted a system of
probabilistic enforcement to reduce deadweight losses. If the tax collector does
not respect P, then the expected penalty is (0.15)(1.1P)x, or 0.165Px. In this
instance, if the tax collector sets enforcement at less than 60.6%, then it is in the
interest of the seller not to remit sales tax. The same analysis that follows would
apply in this situation, with taxable 0.15Px suitably replaced by 0.165Px.
166. In general, if [(1+r)P – C@Prx(1 + t), the seller will produce products
and sell them. In other words, if the seller can set P C/(1 + r(1 – x – xt)), then it
will sell.
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(including a nominal tax) at $100, $104, or $108, because these
are the maximum amounts each respective buyer is willing to
pay. In other words, the seller maximizes its revenue by setting
1.1P right at the reservation price of one of the buyers, because if
the seller priced just below one of these amounts, it could always
raise the price to the next highest reservation price without
losing any buyers. 167 (These prices correspond to nominal, pre-tax
prices, P, of $90.91, $94.54, and $98.18.)
At a $100 tax-inclusive price, all three buyers would
purchase, so the seller’s net after-tax profits would be –$40.91x
[i.e., –0.15 * $90.91 * 3 * x], 168 since the seller earns no pre-tax
profit on each sale. In other words, at $100, if the government
enforces the tax at all, the seller cannot break even, and no
products are sold. Thus, at $100, the only option for the
government is to set the enforcement rate at 0%. This case is
equivalent to no tax, and social welfare is 12. 169 At a $104 taxinclusive price, there are only two buyers, and the seller’s
revenue would be $8 – $28.362x [i.e., 2 * ($104 – $100) – x(0.15 *
$94.54 * 2)]. In this case, x  (that is, the audit rate must be
less than or equal to 28.2%) for the seller to break even. Social
welfare is $4 (consumer surplus from the buyer with a $108
reservation price) + $8 (producer surplus from the seller’s net pretax profits of $4 per sale) – $28.362x (reduction in producer
surplus due to net expected sales taxes and penalties) + $28.362x
(utility of tax to society). Thus, the government maximizes its
revenue by setting x to 0.282, resulting in social welfare of $12. 170
At $108, there is only one buyer, and the seller’s net after-tax
profits would be $8 – $14.727x [i.e., ($108 – $100) – x(0.15 *
$98.18)]. Social welfare is $8 (producer surplus) – $14.727x
167. In general, the government knows that PRE (reserve price) = C + dn for
the nth consumer. The government will analyze what results if the seller sets P
equal to the reservation price for each consumer (assuming Pr satisfies the
inequality in note 166) and will determine the net social welfare that results.
168. This represents the 10% tax plus the 50% penalty (an effective rate of
15%), multiplied by the base price of $90.91, for three products sold.
169. In general, if P = C, the only way to satisfy the inequality in note 166 is
to set r = 0.
170. Note that the government cannot increase social welfare by reducing its
revenue.
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(reduction in producer surplus due to taxes) + $14.727x (utility of
tax to society). In this case, x ZKLFKPHDQVVRFLDOZHOIDUH
would be $8. 171
The government desires to maximize social welfare, so it
would like the seller to set 1.1P to $104 (i.e., P to $94.54). If the
government sets its audit rate, x, such that 0.282 < x  
then the seller will price at $108, because it cannot earn a profit
at $104. If the government sets x = 0.282, the seller will try to
price at $108 to maximize its revenue. However, in a competitive
market, the price will be driven down to exactly where the seller
earns nothing after taxes, which is $104. Thus, the government
sets the rate at 0.282, which results in the optimal outcome of $12
in surplus ($8 in taxes plus $4 in ordinary consumer surplus).
This increases welfare over a classical tax by $12, exactly
matching the social welfare of no tax.172
In sum, sales taxes can reduce consumer demand,
particularly for highly elastic products. 173 In our example, the

171.

In general, the government (including the enforcement agency) will

seek to maximize net social surplus, which is the sum of

(consumer

,
surplus) and M(P – C) (pre-tax producer surplus), which reduces to
provided that the government’s tax revenue meets a minimum goal, G. Because
production costs are fixed, net surplus is maximized when P is as low as
possible, as long as M(P – C G. Thus, the government begins by analyzing the
lowest PRE > C, checking to see if it can raise G, and if not, proceeds to the next
lowest PRE and so forth. Once the government finds the lowest PRE satisfying its
revenue needs, the enforcement agency sets its audit rate x at a level whereby it
taxes away all of the producer surplus, leaving the seller with zero net revenue,
just enough to induce it to produce (and, in this regard, recall that opportunity
costs are included in the seller’s overall costs, C, per product). Recall that if P 
C/(1 + r(1 – x – xt)), the seller will produce and sell the product. Thus, for the
optimum Pr, the enforcement agency will choose x (and possibly t, if it has the
discretion to set the penalty for non-payment), such that P = C/(1 + r(1 – x – xt)).
172. Note that if social utility is increased from taxation, then pricing at
$104 would exceed the social welfare of no tax, because society’s utility would
increase more than the loss to the producer when it remits the sales tax and
penalty. See supra note 152.
173. In general, the reduction in consumer surplus with probabilistic
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product was so elastic that the sales tax reduced demand to zero,
resulting in a net reduction of welfare of $12 relative to no
taxation. The standard solutions to this problem include changes
in tax rates, offering subsidies, and making purchases
deductible. 174 However, these solutions must all be implemented
at the legislative or substantive rulemaking levels, raising public
choice issues and potentially entailing significant implementation
costs. 175 Our model offers a novel solution to the problem:
probabilistic, “measured” tax enforcement that relies on agency
enforcement discretion and does not depend on the risk profile of
the taxpayer for its results. 176
Importantly, measured enforcement can reduce distortions
from suboptimal taxation while maintaining or increasing overall
tax revenue. 177 In our example, overall tax revenue was increased
relative to a fully enforced sales tax, and overall welfare was
returned exactly to the level of no tax whatsoever. Although
probabilistic enforcement is certainly not a costless solution, as
we discuss in Part IV, it provides quite a different manner of
reducing the distortionary effects of taxation from the traditional
solutions and, for that reason, may lend itself to problems for

enforcement compared with no tax is
– (N – M)C where there are N
consumers with no tax and M consumers with a probabilistically enforced tax.
Compared to a certain tax, the increase in consumer surplus from a
probabilistically enforced tax is
– (M – N + K)C, where K is the number
of consumers who could not purchase the product with a perfectly enforced tax
relative to no tax. See supra notes 156–57.
174. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
175. See Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bureaucracy, and Public Choice, 6
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 176 (1998) (“[P]ublic choice theory posits that laws and
regulations are supplied by lawmakers and bureaucrats to the political groups
or coalitions that outbid competing groups.”).
176. Tax authorities such as the IRS generally determine their enforcement
priorities. See, e.g., Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Sets New Audit
Priorities (Sept. 2002), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-02-12.pdf (“The
Internal Revenue Service is realigning its audit resources to focus on key areas
of noncompliance with the tax laws. The strategy represents a new direction for
the agency’s compliance effort.”).
177. See infra Part IV.
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which traditional solutions have been unworkable. Before we
turn to that discussion, we examine in the next section how
probabilistic enforcement can reduce distortions resulting from
externalities from the sale of certain products.
B. Reducing Allocative Distortions in the Context of Externalities
The production, sale, and use of many goods can produce
positive or negative externalities—namely, effects on parties
other than the manufacturer-seller or the consumer. 178 For
instance, the sale and use of gasoline may lead to pollution and
even war (negative externalities), 179 while the sale and use of
books may lead to more informed voting and hence improved
political
leadership,
among
other
benefits
(positive
180
externalities).
To illustrate these concerns in the context of probabilistic
taxation, we focus on products with different elasticities. Because
sales taxes dampen demand for higher elasticity products more
than they do for lower elasticity products, sales taxes may result
in allocative distortions by relatively increasing purchases of the
product with the lower elasticity. 181 This allocative distortion
178. See MANKIW, supra note 129, at 195–201 (“In the presence of
externalities, society’s interest in a market outcome extends beyond the wellbeing of buyers and sellers who participate in the market to include the wellbeing of bystanders who are affected indirectly.”).
179. See, e.g., James Donnelly-Saalfield, Irreparable Harms: How the
Devastating Effects of Oil Extraction in Nigeria Have Not Been Remedied by
Nigerian Courts, the African Commission, or U.S. Courts, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371, 372–76 (2009) (describing the environmental degradation
in Nigeria related to the extraction of oil and gas); Steven D. Levitt, Hurray for
High Gas Prices!, FREAKONOMICS: THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (June 18,
2007, 9:40 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2007/06/18/hurray-for-high-gasprices/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (arguing that higher gas prices decrease several
possible externalities associated with driving) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
180. See, e.g., DAVID L. ULIN, THE LOST ART OF READING: WHY BOOKS MATTER
IN A DISTRACTED TIME (2010); Publishing in Latin America, A Literary Deficit,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2011, at 44, http://www.economist.com/node/21541435
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (discussing the low volume of books published in Latin
America and linking it with lower levels of reading proficiency in these
countries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. See Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX

1720

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679 (2013)

could in turn lead to negative externalities not fully encompassed
by the consumer deadweight loss from decreased demand
resulting from the sales tax. 182
For example, suppose that, after a sales tax is imposed,
consumers continue to purchase gasoline (low elasticity) but forgo
purchasing high-elasticity products, such as books. 183 Two
potential costs may arise. First, the failure to purchase the highelasticity product (here, books) may lead to effective negative
externalities
(from
reduced
positive
externalities). 184
Additionally, or alternatively, if consumers do not purchase the
high-elasticity product at the higher price, they may purchase
more of the low-elasticity product. 185 If the purchase of the lowelasticity product (here, gasoline) creates negative externalities,
then society will suffer from additional purchases. 186 Uncertainty
in the enforcement of taxes can reduce these externalities in at
least two ways.
First, uncertainty can dampen negative externalities
resulting from reduced demand for high-elasticity products like
books. Suppose the high-elasticity product, such as books, has the
same producer and consumer characteristics as in the example in
the previous section, but further assume that when the product is
not purchased, there is a negative externality (or, more precisely,

REV. 39, 63 (1996) (“The size of the loss or burden [resulting from allocative
distortions] depends upon the responsiveness or elasticity of the change. The
greater the elasticity, the more taxpayers change behavior and the more the tax
distorts.”).
182. Cf. Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the
Income Tax 1 (NBER Working Paper No. 5055, 1995), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5055 (“[D]eadweight losses are substantially
greater than . . . conventional estimates because the traditional framework
ignores the effect of higher income tax rates on tax avoidance . . . through
changes in the patterns of consumption . . . .”).
183. For simplicity, we assume the high-elasticity goods result in positive
externalities and the low-elasticity goods result in negative externalities.
184. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration
Policy, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 271, 283–84 (2003), http://time.dufe.edu.cn/
jingjiwencong/waiwenziliao1/271.pdf (discussing the loss of positive externalities
from skilled workers as a cost).
185. See supra note 159.
186. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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a loss of a positive externality) of $1 per product. 187 Under the
above assumptions, the net social welfare from a fully enforced
sales tax would be a $3 loss from the negative externalities
created by the forgone purchases of the three consumers. 188 In
this event, a probabilistic tax has even greater effect in reducing
social losses. In particular, at the optimal enforcement levels in
the prior example, the seller sets the price of the good at $104,
which results in two purchases, and—absent any externalities—
as calculated earlier, $12 in net social welfare. 189 Taking into
account the $2 of positive externalities from the two purchases,
total surplus increases to $14. 190
Second, uncertainty can reduce negative externalities that
result from the additional purchases of low-elasticity products
(e.g., gasoline) that result when consumers forgo purchasing
high-elasticity products. Suppose that in the absence of a tax,
product B (here, gasoline) has three buyers—one who values it at
$58, one at $54, and one at $50. 191 Each unit of gasoline sold has

187. In general, let Ep represent the net welfare gain (or loss) that arises
from externalities when a product is purchased.
188. In general, recall that in the event of a tax and no externalities, net
, where K is the number of consumers who do not
social welfare is
purchase the product in the presence of a tax. See supra notes 156–57. If the
purchase of a product results in Ep of welfare gain from externalities, then in
the presence of a tax, net social welfare is

. In other words, overall

welfare is reduced in the presence of a tax by
relative to no tax,
because of the decrease in purchases in the presence of a tax.
189. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
190. In general, compared to a certain tax, the increase in consumer surplus
– (M – N + K)C, where K is the
from a probabilistic tax is
number of consumers who could not purchase the product with a perfectly
enforced tax. Cf. supra note 173.
191. In general, assume the reserve price for each nth consumer for each ith
product is defined as Prni (reserve price) = Ci + dni, where Ci is the cost of
producing the ith product and dni is each nth consumer’s private value of the ith
product over the seller’s production cost. See supra note 155.
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negative externalities of $25. 192 Suppose the seller breaks even at
a competitive price of $50. In this event, with no tax, net welfare
is $12 (consumer surplus), $0 (producer surplus), and –$75
(negative externalities), resulting in –$63. 193 With a sales tax rate
of 10% and perfect and certain enforcement (and abstracting
away from allocative effects), only the buyer at $58 purchases,
since the cost of the product with sales tax is $55 ($50 base plus
$5 in sales tax). In this event, in a competitive market, net social
welfare is $3 (consumer surplus), $0 (producer surplus), $5 (social
welfare from taxation), and –$25 (negative externality), resulting
in –$17. 194 Thus, the sales tax has a beneficial effect relative to
none, which is an example of a classic Pigouvian tax designed to
reduce consumption.
Yet, the situation becomes more complicated to address
through a Pigouvian tax when both product A and product B
come into play. Suppose that the buyer of product A (books) who
values the product at $108 is the buyer of product B (gasoline)
who values it at $58. 195 Suppose this buyer would value a second
item of product B at $55 and a third item of B at $50. 196 In this
event, without a sales tax, the buyer prefers to use its limited
funds (assume, of $165) to purchase A and B at a $100 and $50,
respectively, resulting in net consumer surplus of $16 ($108 –
$100 + $58 – $50). 197 However, with a fully enforced sales tax on
192. In general, let Epi represent the net welfare gain (or loss) that arises
when each ith product is purchased arising from externalities. See supra note
187 (defining Ep).
.

193.

In general, net social welfare with no tax is

194.

In general, the net increase in social welfare in taxing a product with

, where K is the number of consumers who
negative externalities is
forgo purchasing the product in the presence of the tax.
195. In general, and assuming one buyer for simplicity, Pri (reserve price) =
Ci + di.
196. In general, we can treat multiple items of the same product as
effectively different products, wherein Pri (reserve price) = Ci + di, such that i
increases proportionally.
197. In general, if the buyer has limited funds F, then with no tax, the buyer
will maximize its consumer surplus by allocating F such that the product with
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A and B, the buyer will purchase none of A since it will cost $110
to purchase A. 198 Thus, the buyer purchases two of B at $55
(including sales tax), resulting in consumer surplus of $3 ($58 –
$55 + $55 – $55). In this event, producer welfare is 0, negative
externalities are –$50, and government welfare is $10 (the $10 of
sales tax collected on product B), resulting in a net social welfare
of –$37, which is better than the –$63 net welfare with no tax,
but worse than the net welfare of –$17 when there is no allocative
shift. 199
Thus, the allocative shift caused by the sales tax worsens net
utility with respect to a sales tax on product B. By imposing a
probabilistic enforcement scheme on product A, but not on
product B—thereby causing the buyer to continue to purchase
product A—this allocative distortion can be reduced or removed,
increasing net welfare. In particular, suppose the government
sets the enforcement rate on product A’s sales tax to 54.322%,
which—following the analysis in the previous section—results in
a price of $108. In this event, the buyer would be indifferent
between purchasing two of product B (consumer surplus of $3 and
social welfare of –$37, see above) and one of product A and one of
product B (consumer surplus of $3 and social welfare of –$9). 200
the highest di is purchased first, then the next highest product, and so forth,
wherein j total products are purchased, with a net consumer surplus of
.
198. In general, where C is fixed, recall that with a tax rate r, the post-tax
product price becomes P(1+r), or C(1+r). In this event, any product for which Ci
+ di < Ci(1+ r) (i.e., di < rCi), the consumer will not purchase the product. See
supra note 157 (describing the effects of a sales tax on multiple consumers in a
one-product model).
199. In general, if a sales tax causes the single consumer to buy fewer
products (including additional units of the same underlying product), this will
reduce consumer and social welfare. Because the forgone purchases in this
example have positive externalities, the tax further reduces social welfare.
Suppose the consumer forgoes the purchase of h products. In this instance, the
, where it assumed that the forgone
decrease in social welfare is
purchases would have resulted in positive externalities, Ei.
200. Specifically, the consumer surplus from the purchase of product B is $3
($58 – $55), the producer surplus is $0 ($50 pre-tax price – $50 cost), the

1724

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679 (2013)

Assuming that there are no costs for the buyer to switch from
product A to product B, the buyer will engage in a mixed strategy,
purchasing one of product A and one of product B 50% of the time
and two of product B 50% of the time. 201 Moreover, if there is
even a small cost to the buyer to switch from product A to product
B, then the buyer will always buy one of product A and one of
product B. 202 In either event, the negative externalities
introduced from the allocative distortions of taxation are reduced,
thereby increasing social welfare (even disregarding the other
benefits from imperfect taxation described above). 203
IV. Some Caveats and Implications of Measured Enforcement
As the discussion above has shown, a measured enforcement
approach can reduce economic distortions that may result from a
sales or similar tax, while maintaining, or even increasing, the
tax revenue that would otherwise be collected under a fully
enforced tax. In the examples above, measured enforcement was
shown to reduce the allocative distortions that result from
asymmetric demand shifts for products of differing elasticities
and externalities subject to a uniform sales tax. In effect,
government surplus is $5 (in taxes paid), and the negative externalities are –
$25, resulting in a total of –$17 in net social welfare. The social welfare from the
sale of product A is $8 (producer surplus)–$14.727x (reduction in producer
surplus due to taxes) + $14.727x (utility of tax to society), which results in a net
social welfare of $8. See supra Part III.A. Thus, total net social welfare from the
purchase of product A and product B is –$9.
201. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
GAME THEORY 66 (1989) (“A mixed strategy maps each of a player’s possible
information sets to a probability distribution over actions.” (emphasis removed)).
202. See Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q.J.
ECON. 375, 375 (1987), http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/market.pdf
(describing three categories of consumer switching costs, including “transaction
costs, learning costs, and artificial or contractual costs”).
203. In general, in the presence of a probabilistic enforcement scheme, the
single buyer will on average purchase more of the products forgone in the face of
a perfect tax. If we suppose for simplicity that the consumer now purchases g
additional products, the increase in social welfare relative to a certain tax is
.
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measured tax enforcement can correct for the distortions
resulting from applying uniform laws to very different goods,
without reducing overall tax revenue. 204
Moreover, because tax authorities typically have discretion to
set audit priorities, they can implement such a strategy without
going through rulemaking processes or waiting for legislative
change, both of which are time-consuming and costly. 205 As long
as the tax authority can identify which products have positive
externalities and which have negative ones, and roughly what the
demand elasticities are for those products, it can adopt a
measured enforcement scheme that will be socially beneficial.
Moreover, the legislature is free to respond to this change in the
de facto content of the tax laws by changing the substantive
content of the laws or even earmarking appropriations for certain
types of audits. 206 Of course the measured enforcement approach
is built on some assumptions, and may raise questions about its
effects and consequences. This Part addresses those issues, as
well as other potential welfare effects of measured enforcement.
A. Assumptions
1. Competency and Communicativeness of the Enforcement Agency
In order for measured enforcement to succeed, the
enforcement agency must be sufficiently knowledgeable about the
effects of taxation to tailor the enforcement of uniform tax laws to
204. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 38–40 (suggesting in the context
of analyzing public versus private enforcement that “discretionary
nonenforcement” by public authorities can reduce the costs of enforcing rules
that are otherwise overinclusive).
205. See id. at 38 (“The more particularly the legislature tried to describe
the forbidden conduct, the more loopholes it would open up.”).
206. See supra note 176. Of course, if the legislature were to implement a
perfectly optimal law, then there would be no role for measured enforcement.
See Yitzhaki, supra note 80, at 134 (arguing that the welfare gains from
encouraging taxpayer “cheating” will not “increase[] welfare beyond what will be
achieved by an optimal tax rate” adopted in the substantive law). However, for
reasons we set forth below, there will nearly always be a substantial residuum
of suboptimal substantive law ripe for measured enforcement. See infra Part
IV.B.2.
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achieve effectively differentiated laws. For instance, in the sales
tax examples presented earlier, the enforcement agency had
complete knowledge of the relevant demand curves, supply
curves, and the seller’s production and opportunity costs. 207 Of
course, such complete knowledge is unrealistic, and hence
achieving perfect measured enforcement is impossible. 208 Yet, our
model need not achieve anywhere near the ideal to improve social
utility compared to the current system, 209 which generally
allocates scarce enforcement resources in those areas in which
the agency believes it can collect the most revenue, taking little to
no account of the consequences of effectively implementing a
differentiated substantive tax system via differentiated
enforcement. 210 Because our model allows the government to
achieve the same or even a greater level of tax revenue, 211
blindness to the distortionary effects of taxation will generally
lead to inferior economic results compared to a system in which
the enforcer consciously tailors enforcement to diminish these
effects. 212
Thus, as long as the enforcement agency has a rough
knowledge of the relevant economic landscape and the effects of
taxation on economic actors, it can measure its enforcement
207. See supra Part III. Relatedly, we assumed a constant producer cost
(including opportunity costs) for each product, and a competitive market
wherein all producers have the same per-product cost. See supra note 154. In
general, such costs will not be constant and markets will be imperfect, making
complete knowledge even less attainable.
208. See Zolt, supra note 181, at 66–67 (“The information requirements for
designing a tax system based on optimal tax principles are substantial. We
would need to determine the compensated elasticities of supply and demand for
thousands of commodities. . . . As the number of product categories and different
rates increases, enforcement and compliance costs increase.”).
209. See generally Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 25 (setting forth the
theory of the “second best,” whereby otherwise suboptimal solutions may become
optimal in the face of external “constraints”).
210. See Jeffrey A. Dubin & Louis L. Wilde, An Empirical Analysis of
Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance, 41 NAT’L TAX J. 61, 71 (1988)
(noting that the IRS directs auditing resources to areas that show the least
compliance).
211. See supra Part III.
212. That is, measured enforcement can maximize both tax revenues and
social welfare, while the traditional approach maximizes only revenue, ignoring
the deadweight losses imposed by taxation.
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strategies to potentially achieve economically superior
outcomes. 213 Specifically, (1) if the tax laws as written do not
maximize social utility and legislative change is infeasible, 214 and
(2) the marginal costs of measured enforcement—which we
address below—are less than the marginal benefits, then it will
generally be sensible for the enforcement agency to adopt a
measured, rather than a revenue-maximizing, strategy. 215
Of course, what constitutes sufficient knowledge such that
the marginal benefits of measured enforcement outweigh the
costs across a wide class of situations is not a simple question to
answer. Yet, even if one believes that the enforcement agency
would have difficulty in even roughly determining product
elasticities, demand curves, supply curves, production costs,
opportunity costs, and taxpayer risk profiles, then our approach
would still apply to “outlier” situations in which the negative
effects of taxation were relatively clear. For instance, it would be
advisable to reduce enforcement with respect to highly elastic
products producing positive externalities. 216
213. For similar reasons, the fact that measured enforcement for a given
product space (for example, automobiles) may affect complementary product
spaces (for example, road paving machines), thereby creating complex supply
and demand curve dynamics, is not fatal to our approach. Rather, the
enforcement agency need have only a comparative advantage over the
legislature and rulemaking authority in determining these secondary
relationships and implementing measures to counteract the distortions that
result from these dynamic effects.
214. The tax authority can make this determination by examining whether
products with different elasticities or externalities are taxed at the same rate.
The tax authority’s ability to make these determinations is discussed below. See
infra notes 247–49 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 212; cf. Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Optimal Taxation
and Administrative Costs, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 475 (1979) (“The social cost of
taxation is the sum of the administrative cost and the deadweight loss caused by
the tax system.”).
216. A large, well-funded enforcement agency might be able to implement a
differentiated enforcement strategy at a lower cost than Congress or a state
legislature, because it presumably would avoid the public choice issues faced by
elected officials. See Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial
Behavior: Macey’s Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 183 (1991) (“In
accord with the assumption of self-interest, public choice theorists have
described political activity, including government itself, as a market in which
officials sell favorable action in return for votes, money (which may help in
reelection bids), postgovernment employment, other support, or a combination of
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Another crucial assumption in our model is that the
taxpayers are knowledgeable about the enforcement rates and
penalties. 217 If the enforcement agency publishes the details of
audit strategy, rates, penalties, settlements, and the like,
presumably most affected taxpayers—or their tax advisers—
would be empowered to respond appropriately to a measured tax
enforcement strategy on the part of the agency. In many cases,
however, the relevant enforcement rates may be much more
specific than audit rates, because a single return may relate to
many classes of transactions. 218 In this situation, the effective
enforcement rate reflects a combination of (1) the probability of
audit and (2) the agency’s stance with respect to the taxation of
the items it identifies in the audit. In order to inform taxpayers of
these varying enforcement strategies and rates, the agency would
need to publish—and taxpayers and their advisers would need to
absorb—detailed information. 219 As such, our model may only be
suitable for only the most sophisticated taxpayers.

these.”). An agency should also have more flexibility in tailoring its enforcement,
and adapting it from year to year as needed, than it would by going through
substantive rulemaking, which—at least in the federal context—is generally
subject to notice-and-comment procedures if the rule is to have the “force of
law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (providing for notice-and-comment rulemaking,
subject to limited exceptions such as “good cause” and interpretative
rulemaking).
217. See supra Part III.
218. See, e.g., Mary Dalrymple, GE Files Tax Return That's 24,000 Pages:
Would Have Been Eight Feet Tall, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 1, 2006, at
BU4, available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13068387/ns/business-personal_
finance/t/ge-files--page-tax-return/ (“[General Electric] filed a 24,000-page tax
return to the Internal Revenue Service this month.”); All Products, GENERAL
ELECTRIC, http://www.ge.com/products (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (listing the
numerous types of products and services offered by General Electric) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
219. Currently, the IRS publishes general information about audit rates. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXAMINATION COVERAGE: RECOMMENDED AND AVERAGE
RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL TAX AFTER EXAMINATION, BY TYPE AND SIZE OF
RETURN, FISCAL YEAR 2012 in IRS DATA BOOK, available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Examination-Coverage:-Recommended-andAverage- Recommended-Additional-Tax-After-Examination-IRS-Data-Book-Table9a (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (providing an Excel spreadsheet of relevant tax
information from the year 1998 to the present) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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Moreover, the disclosure of detailed information regarding
enforcement could, in theory, lead to widespread, undesired
noncompliance. 220 However, the disclosure contemplated by the
model is simply audit rates, not the specific likelihood that any
particular taxpayer will be audited. 221 The taxpayers who can use
this information strategically are those who are making
compliance decisions based primarily on a cost-benefit analysis,
and the measured enforcement system depends on that costbenefit analysis for its results. 222 Furthermore, if necessary, any
undesired increase in noncompliance could be dampened by
increasing penalties. These concerns suggest that any experiment
with measured enforcement proceed cautiously and at least
initially be limited to categories of taxpayers, such as publicly
held corporations, likely to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and
able to pay tax penalties. 223
2. Income Effects
As discussed above, taxation can have “substitution effects”
on market activity. Substitution effects reflect taxpayer migration
to a less-taxed good or activity. For example, an income tax may
reduce labor as taxpayers substitute untaxed leisure, and a sales

220. See Raskolnikov, supra note 18, at 590 (“Audit strategies such as the
audit selection formulas are among the IRS’s most closely guarded secrets. The
government has been very reluctant to release individual return data collected
through [the Tax Compliance Measurement Program] out of concern that
researchers would use it to reverse-engineer audit formulas.” (footnote
omitted)).
221. See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part III.
223. Cf. Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in
the U.S. Tax Law in the Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United
States, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 381, 407 (2006) (“In recent years corporations have
weighed the estimated benefits with the associated costs of a transaction even
with respect to tax-motivated transactions.”); Lawrence Zelenak, Codifying AntiAvoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 S.M.U. L. REV.
177, 187 (2001) (“A risk-neutral corporation would decide to enter into a tax
shelter transaction as long as the tax cost of not entering the shelter is greater
than the expected cost of entering the shelter.”).
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tax may reduce consumption of the taxed products. 224 This type of
market distortion is what measured enforcement can address.
However, taxes can also have “income effects,” meaning that
taxpayers adjust to the decrease in their buying power by
increasing their labor so as to retain the same post-tax buying
power. 225 In an income tax or sales tax system, income effects and
substitution effects are offsetting, at least to some extent, in that
they pull in opposite directions. 226 For example, in the presence of
a sales tax on gasoline, a taxpayer might both reduce gasoline
purchases (e.g., substituting carpooling or the use of mass transit
or a bicycle), while also working slightly more to pay for any
remaining increase in the cost of gas.
Substitution effects may dominate income effects. 227 In fact,
whether a tax gives rise to an income effect depends on what the
government does with the revenue raised by the tax. 228 For
example, if the government charges a $10 sales tax on a
particular item but provides $10 in a lump sum to the taxpayer,
that series of events will not give rise to an income effect because
the taxpayer’s purchasing power will not have decreased. 229 The
224. See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text.
225. See Ilan Benshalom & Kendra Stead, Values and (Market) Valuations:
A Critique of the Endowment Consensus, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1511, 1519–20
(2010) (explaining “income effect” as “meaning that, as a result of the tax,
individuals would have less consumption power and, therefore, may have an
incentive to work more to meet their needs”).
226. See Sugin, supra note 130, at 236
The income effect in an income tax (increased work to achieve a set
level of after-tax wage) is tempered by the offsetting substitution
effect (decreased work on account of avoiding the tax by choosing
leisure instead of work) so that the two distortions together might
add up to less than either one separately.
227. See Richard M. Hynes, Non-Procustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 301, 322 (“Economists typically believe the substitution effect will
dominate and lower tax rates will induce individuals to work harder, and, in any
case, the income effect is irrelevant from the standpoint of efficiency.” (footnote
omitted)).
228. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience,
65 TAX L. REV. 19, 63 (2011) (“When tax instruments are fully market-salient,
whether the tax instruments produce income effects depends on what the
governments do with their collected tax revenues.”).
229. See id. The tax will still give rise to a substitution effect if there are
similar but untaxed goods.
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question of whether the income effect or the substitution effect
dominates with respect to a given tax is an empirical one, 230
unless a tax change is revenue-neutral, in which case, the
substitution effect will dominate. 231 Moreover, taxpayers may be
more readily able to decrease consumption than to increase
income, at least in the short run. Although some hourly workers
might be readily able to request additional hours, other workers,
such as those on salary, will have a harder time smoothly
increasing income. 232 For all of those reasons, our model assumes
that income effects are de minimis, so that substitution effects
dominate. In those areas in which income effects dominate, our
model would have less force. 233

230. See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121
HARV. L. REV. 469, 497 (2007) (“Economic theory cannot predict whether the
income effect or the substitution effect will dominate: that is an empirical
question.”).
231. See Christopher Heady, Optimal Taxation as a Guide to Tax Policy: A
Survey, 14 FISCAL STUD. 15, 22 (1993) (“[I]n revenue-neutral tax changes the
average taxpayer does not have an income effect, so only the substitution effect
operates for that person.”).
232. See Jane G. Gravelle, Behavioral Responses to Proposed High-Income
Tax Rate Increases: An Evaluation of the Feldstein–Feenberg Study, 59 TAX
NOTES 1097, 1100 (1993) (“Many salaried workers are employed for a standard
work period or to do a standard job and cannot easily vary the amount of labor
supplied.”).
233. Another assumption in our sales tax example is that the sellers are not
additionally subject to an income tax. See supra Part III. Specifically, we
assumed that the sellers retained the full amount of the income-derived profit
necessary to induce them to sell in a given competitive market. See supra Part
III. If this assumption is relaxed so that some portion of the seller’s actual
profits is taxed away via an income tax, then our model would become much
more complex, yielding potentially different results. See Schweizer, supra note
97, at 256 (contending that when seller profits are fully taxed away and other
conditions hold, then “tax evasion . . . would necessarily be suboptimal”). Yet, if
the government were to adopt a strategy to intentionally encourage less than
full compliance with the nominal tax laws, it could also adjust taxation on
income in a similar manner—for instance, by auditing the income tax returns of
sellers of highly elastic goods less frequently. So while the imposition of an
income tax would make our model more complex, it would not change our
ultimate results, at least in theory. Of course, it might increase the practical
difficulties in implementing such a strategy.
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B. Some Possible Consequences of Measured Enforcement
In this section, we address other potential consequences of a
measured tax enforcement strategy, including costs stemming
from increased uncertainty, as well as concerns regarding agency
expertise, accountability, and discrimination among similarly
situated taxpayers. While all of these concerns should be taken
seriously, none of them counsels against considering at least a
limited measured enforcement strategy.
1. The Costs of Uncertainty
Because measured tax enforcement requires audits at less
than a 100% probability, it inherently would create some
uncertainty for taxpayers regarding the expected tax payment if
they fail to comply with the tax laws. Generally speaking, legal
uncertainty can impose significant public and private compliance
costs. 234 In the tax context, James Alm has argued that
“uncertain tax policies make individual choices in a variety of
dimensions more difficult.” 235 Specifically, tax law uncertainty
can increase planning and related transaction costs, because
taxpayers cannot easily predict, for example, whether they are
subject to a given tax, whether they can take a deduction, and so
forth, 236 which can lead taxpayers to forgo transactions that
234. See, e.g., J. SCOTT MOODY, WENDY P. WARCHOLIK & SCOTT A. HODGE,
SPECIAL REPORT: THE RISING COST OF COMPLYING WITH THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
2 (2005), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/sr138.pdf (“If
lawmakers create an Internal Revenue Code that is unnecessarily complex or
that changes rapidly, taxpayers will face uncertainty about how taxes will affect
a business plan or investment. When the tax consequences of economic activities
are unpredictable, tax policy handicaps the growth and dynamism of the U.S.
economy.”).
235. Alm, supra note 87, at 237; see also Yitzhaki, supra note 80, at 129 (“In
the case of tax evasion the excess burden [(deadweight loss)] occurs because of
the uncertainty introduced into the economy by tax evasion.”).
236. See Alm, supra note 87, at 237 (“Individuals who are planning their
financial affairs . . . need to know whether tax changes will alter the return on
their tax shelters by changing such things as depreciation rules, investment tax
credits, interest deductions, at-risk rules, or capital gains tax rates and holding
periods.”); Jonathan Skinner, The Welfare Cost of Uncertain Tax Policy, 37 J.
PUB. ECON. 129, 144 (1988) (estimating the additional burden of uncertain
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would be welfare enhancing. 237 Indeed, a study in the 1980s
estimated the welfare costs of uncertain taxation at $15 billion in
1986 dollars. 238
However,
the
kind
of
unpredictable
uncertainty
(“uncertainty” in the economic usage of Frank Knight) that leads
to large transaction costs is quite different from the type of
predictable uncertainty (“risk” in the Knightian sense) that forms
the basis of our “measured” approach to enforcement. 239 Unlike
unpredictable uncertainty, a computable risk usually can be
readily factored into a taxpayer’s economic analysis of proposed
courses of dealing. 240 Thus, if enforcement rates and strategies
are generally stable and known by taxpayers, then the costs from
uncertainty should be relatively minimal compared with the
benefits of measured enforcement.
Moreover, since enforcement today is already an “audit
lottery,” 241 simply restructuring the lottery by adjusting existing
audit rates should—at least in the long run—give rise to no
substantially greater costs from uncertainty than the existing
system. In fact, because our model contemplates publishing much
more information about the enforcement agency’s strategies,
rather than certain tax policy to be $15 billion in 1986).
237. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance,
25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 343 (2005)
[S]ophisticated taxpayers who are considering engaging in some sort
of business transaction . . . [may] face substantial uncertainty as to
how the tax laws will be applied to their particular transaction. It is
easy to understand how such uncertainty might deter a risk-averse
taxpayer from engaging in welfare-enhancing, wealth-creating
transactions . . . especially if the uncertainty in question could
feasibly be eliminated or reduced.
238. Skinner, supra note 236, at 143.
239. KNIGHT, supra note 74, at 19–20, 197–232; cf. Lawsky, supra note 71, at
243 (defining uncertainty as “an unknown probability”).
240. See Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual
Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755, 759 (2009) (“‘Risk’ refers to randomness
whose probabilistic nature is extremely familiar and can be characterized with
objective probabilities (such as the outcome odds that attend the roll of a fair
die). ‘Uncertainty,’ in contrast, refers to randomness whose probabilistic
behavior is extremely unfamiliar, unknown, or even unknowable.”).
241. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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uncertainty of all kinds should actually substantially decrease
relative to today’s system. 242 Ironically, while decreased
uncertainty should prove beneficial to taxpayers in planning
transactions, it may diminish the beneficial effects of uncertainty
on risk-averse taxpayers, identified by Weiss and others,
discussed above. 243 However, given that we recommend
considering the use of our model only for the most sophisticated
of taxpayers, which tend to be more risk-neutral than ordinary
taxpayers, such secondary effects are likely to be minimal. 244
2. The Importance of Agency Expertise
As explained above, the enforcement agency must be
sufficiently knowledgeable in order to successfully implement a
measured enforcement strategy. 245 Of course, since agencies are
not omniscient, the implementation of such a strategy will
generate error costs. 246 These error costs can be problematic
because measured enforcement affects the de facto content of the
substantive law. For example, if the legislature determines after
a lengthy period of fact-finding that the appropriate sales tax rate
is 5% across a wide class of products, a measured enforcement
scheme that results in little to no compliance for many classes of
242. See Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV.
431, 450 (2008) (“[T]ransparency can facilitate certainty in reporting positions,
and reduce costs of compliance as well as enforcement. Indeed . . . openness can
lead to certainty for both taxpayers and the government.” (footnotes omitted)).
243. See supra notes 78–117 and accompanying text. Additionally,
publishing more information about audit strategies will tend to decrease costly
Knightian uncertainty, but leave intact more beneficial Knightian risk, further
mitigating any negative secondary effects of decreased uncertainty. See supra
note 239 and accompanying text (defining Knightian uncertainty and Knightian
risk).
244. See Joel Slemrod, Tax Minimization and Corporate Responsibility, 96
TAX NOTES TODAY 1523, 1526 (Sept. 9, 2002) (“[A] publicly held corporation
should make decisions as if it is risk-neutral, knowing that its shareholders can
hold a diversified portfolio. More important, the owners of the firm and the
decisionmakers are distinct.”).
245. See supra Part IV.A.
246. See generally Pinaki Bose, Regulatory Errors, Optimal Fines and the
Level of Compliance, 56 J. PUB. ECON. 475 (1995) (analyzing the effects of tax
enforcement errors).
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products will substantially deviate from the legislature’s intent,
potentially leading to significant social costs.
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that the
current revenue-maximizing approach already creates effective
de facto deviations from the substantive law implemented by the
legislature, because many taxpayers will be able to understate
their tax liability without penalty. 247 Nonetheless, because our
model envisions intentional indirect tinkering with the
substantive law, a “measured”—rather than wide-ranging—
tailoring of tax enforcement is the best approach, at least
initially.
The enforcement agency also has certain advantages in
obtaining the information necessary to achieve specific effects
than would the legislature or the agency doing so directly
through traditional lawmaking processes, which may lower
transaction costs. 248 First, the tax agency is the “on-the-ground”
expert regarding tax administration and enforcement. 249
Moreover, while the agency as it stands now is not necessarily
more knowledgeable than the legislature when it comes to
product elasticities, labor-leisure tradeoff functions, externalities,
and such, it may be better positioned to acquire this knowledge.
Specifically, the agency has readily on-hand a storehouse of data
that it can use to compute this information, and it has the
capability and capacity to hire economic experts to manage and
administer such an undertaking. 250 Accordingly, the agency is
247. See Scotchmer, supra note 96, at 229 (“[T]he effective tax code will
differ from the legislated tax code, where the effective tax code reflects actual
payments, including taxes on reported income and the expected value of fines.”).
248. See supra Part IV.A.
249. See Sánchez & Sobel, supra note 96, at 346 (“The government delegates
the responsibility to collect taxes because it is unable to carry out the
enforcement activity on its own. The division of responsibility arises if the task
of enforcing tax policies requires information and expertise that the government
does not have.”).
250. That is, a tax collector such as the IRS has first-hand information about
enforcement strategies and the amount of taxes collected. It also already
employs economists to assist its enforcement strategies. See, e.g., Press Release,
Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Realigns and Renames Large Business Division,
Enhances Focus on International Tax Administration (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Realigns-and-Renames-Large-Business-Division,Enhances-Focus-on-International-Tax-Administration (last visited Aug. 4, 2013)
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likely to be in the best position to observe the dynamic responses
of taxpayers to targeted audit projects.
Second, the political economy costs in the enforcement arena
may be lower than those in the law or rulemaking context. 251
Legislatures are composed of politicians who experience lobbying
and inevitably worry about reelection. 252 The tax authority, by
contrast, is composed of civil servants who do not have to worry
about pleasing the public in the same way. 253 This is particularly
so in the agency enforcement context, in which the agency enjoys
broad discretion over policy, rather than the rulemaking context,
in which the agency will generally face greater procedural
constraints. 254
On the other hand, it is possible that if it became widely
known that the tax enforcement agency was intentionally
(noting the economists on the staff of the Large Business and International
Division of the IRS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 6, at 1014 (noting that there can
be high political costs to certain law making); Daniel C. Richman, Federal
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 757, 801 (1999) (“While the political costs of narrowing the scope of
substantive law appear to be prohibitive, the costs of proposals to restrict
enforcer activities are not . . . .”); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of
Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 795–96 (2006) (suggesting that it is
more politically expedient to change procedural criminal law than substantive
criminal law).
252. See Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation to Defect: A Political and
Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 819–20 (1997) (“Public choice theory, sometimes referred to
as the economic theory of legislation, contends that rational self-interested
legislators tend to enact legislation that favors organized interests to the
detriment of social welfare.” (footnote omitted)).
253. See John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and the Federal Income
Tax System, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 160 (2003) (“[T]he few political
appointees to the agency are limited to the Commissioner’s office, with career
civil servants performing the dominant role in shaping IRS enforcement
decisions.”); Ventry, supra note 242, at 447–48
To date, no one has suggested that the IRS is particularly susceptible
to agency capture. . . . Unlike other agencies, the Service does not
interact as intimately with the entities it regulates. Moreover, it does
not oversee one particular industry with organized representation,
but instead regulates hundreds of millions of taxpayers in hundreds
of thousands of different taxable industries, thereby diffusing the
potential influence of specific interest groups.
254. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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differentiating among various categories of taxpayers in an effort
to decrease deadweight losses, special interest groups would
lobby the agency, presenting information and arguments as to
why lowering the audit rate would benefit society. 255 This
argument is one against targeted laws more generally, as these
same groups could lobby the legislature directly. Moreover, the
tax enforcement agency may be less susceptible to lobbying
because its decisionmakers are not elected officials. 256 For
example, the head of the IRS, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, is appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 257
Finally, agency discretion in enforcement can be diminished
to a significant extent by the legislature’s ability to respond to
any agency changes in the de facto content of the law by adopting
new substantive laws. Specifically, if the legislature passes more
particularized substantive laws, these laws will constrain the
ability of the agency to implement its own differentiated regime
via measured enforcement. 258 The legislature could even go so far
255. A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Structure of Indirect Taxation and
Economic Efficiency, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 97, 98 n.2 (1972) (“The tax structure
eventually emerging [from differentiated taxation] might well be based as much
on relative strengths of these pressure groups as on relative dead weight
losses.”).
256. One potential counterargument is that agency officials are more
susceptible to capture than legislatures, because of the “revolving door”
movement of government employees into lucrative jobs with private-sector
employers who regularly lobby the agency. However, in an analogous context,
“while politics can pave the way to a more lucrative career (such as lobbying),
many politicians remain in the business long past the point of maximizing their
lifetime earnings potential.” Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process As Illustrated by Tax Legislation in
the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 80 (1990). In addition, the IRS seems less subject
to capture than other agencies. See supra note 253. If such activity were afoot, it
would be just as, or even more, prevalent under today’s system as it would be
under one of measured enforcement because we propose publishing detailed
audit information across specific industry sectors, which arguably should
constrain the ability of agency officials to privilege any given industry. See
supra note 242 and accompanying text.
257. See I.R.C. § 7803(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“There shall be in the Department of
the Treasury a Commissioner of Internal Revenue who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
258. Cf. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
859, 883 (2009) (“Compared to legislatures, agencies have many more
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as to require the agency to adopt specific enforcement schemes
with minimum levels of auditing and penalties in particular
areas when it determines the agency has made gross errors in its
cost-benefit analysis—or the legislature could simply provide
funding earmarked for specific audit projects.259
Of course, the costs of particularization by the legislature are
high, but these barriers support implementing measured
enforcement at the agency level. In cases in which the legislature
is better suited to do so—namely, when the legislative
transaction costs of differentiated enforcement are sufficiently
low—then it certainly can institute such a scheme. Alternatively,
the legislature itself can intentionally adopt uncertain laws to
achieve effects similar to those of measured enforcement.260
3. Transparency and Accountability Issues
One important issue with moving de facto lawmaking from
the legislative and rule-making levels to the enforcement level is
that agencies, especially in their enforcement capacity, are less
transparent than the legislative and rule-making processes are.
Legislation usually involves public bills 261 and rulemaking often
involves notice to the public with an opportunity to comment, 262
while enforcement generally has neither of these aspects. 263
constraints on their options fixed by authoritative sources like statutes.”).
259. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But
Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755, 777 (2005) (referencing funding earmarked in 1998
and 2003 for Earned Income Tax Credit enforcement).
260. Cf. Sichelman, supra note 141, at 4–5 (proposing a system of uncertain
intellectual property laws to optimize innovation incentives).
261. See Erik A. Johnson, The Legislative Process, 1951 JAG J. 12, 13, 14
(explaining that resolutions, private bills, and public bills may all be introduced
in Congress, and that “bills proposed to become public laws are the most
common”).
262. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) (providing for notice-and-comment
rulemaking by federal agencies).
263. Confidentiality regarding the enforcement processes and outcomes is
particularly true in the federal tax arena. See M. Bernard Aidinoff et al., Report
and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329, 350 (1988)
(“Privacy statutes mandate that most tax enforcement actions remain
confidential, so that only the small number of criminal tax evasion cases are
routinely publicized.”).
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Transparency fosters accountability, and, conversely, lack of
transparency may give rise to abuses. 264
The reality is that agencies already have enforcement
discretion. However, the IRS, at least, is subject to a great deal of
oversight, 265 and has worked on increasing transparency. 266 The
proposed measured enforcement system would actually increase
transparency through publication of more detailed enforcement
percentage information. 267 This would provide information both
to the general public, and to the legislature, which could respond
to those rates with statutory changes if it found them
warranted. 268 Indeed, measured tax enforcement would ease the
burden of the legislature “getting the rate just right”—instead,
the legislature could set nominal tax rates at the high end of the
spectrum with the intention that the enforcement agency would

264. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
265. A list of “IRS Oversight Organizations” on the IRS website includes The
Government Accountability Office (GAO), The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
(TIGTA), The Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee (ETAAC), The
Information Reporting Program Advisory Committee (IRPAC), The Internal
Revenue Service Advisory Council (IRSAC), The Taxpayer Advocacy Panel
(TAP), and The IRS Oversight Board. IRS Oversight Organizations, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-OversightOrganizations (last visited Aug. 4, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
266. See Reiss, supra note 39, at 646–47 (“[T]he IRS, widely held up for
years as an example of complete non-accountability, has been working for over
ten years on increasing its transparency and responsiveness to the general
public.” (footnote omitted)).
267. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
268. In theory, a measured enforcement regime, particularly in the federal
context, may raise concerns that it could override congressional intent, violate
separation of powers, or violate due process requirements. Those issues
generally are beyond the scope of this article. However, enforcement discretion
is a well-embedded feature of the constitutional landscape, and there is no
indication that in the tax context it depends on the implicit assumption that the
agency will adopt an enforcement strategy that solely turns on maximizing
revenue. See generally Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and
“Clear Reflection of Income”: What Constrains Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 445, 492 (1999) (“[T]he Code . . . reflects a longstanding tradition of
deferring to the Commissioner’s enforcement discretion, rather than prescribing
rule-like boundaries . . . .”).
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use its on-the-ground knowledge and discretion to target its audit
resources so as to achieve more optimal de facto tax rates. 269
4. The Role of Compliance and Noncompliance Norms
Given the costs of enforcement, no system could achieve
100% enforcement of the tax laws, just as no government could
hope to eliminate all traffic violations. However, a system that
depends on less than full compliance to achieve its results risks
the possibility that taxpayers will start to flout the law in large
numbers. 270 That is, if the enforcement system is seen as
encouraging noncompliance, “there may be a strong ‘watershed’
effect,” resulting in a cascade of taxpayer evasion that far
surpasses the socially optimal level. 271 For less economically
driven taxpayers, this watershed may take the form of
encouraging a view that tax evasion is no longer “wrong.” 272
It is thus critical that a measured enforcement system not be
advertised as one that fosters “cheating.” Rather, like the current
system, it is one that audits a fraction of taxpayers and imposes
penalties
on
taxpayers
caught
evading
their
tax

269. We thank Jordan Barry for this suggestion.
270. See Lederman, supra note 58, at 1481–83, 1497 (reporting the findings
of a game theoretic experiment suggesting that “the presence of free riders
lowers average contributions in a public goods game, and in response,
conditional cooperators lower their contributions”); see also Dan Kahan, The
Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 81
(2003). Kahan states:
If most other individuals seem to be paying their taxes, then evasion
will provoke either guilt, shame, or both in the reciprocator who
covets the respect of others and of herself. If, in contrast, most
individuals appear to be evading, then complying won’t make her feel
guilty or ashamed at all; it will make her feel like a sucker.
Id.
271. Cowell, supra note 83, at 184 (“But if you let matters get out of hand it
becomes very much harder to dissuade any one individual from evasion
‘everyone else does it, so why shouldn’t I . . . ?’”).
272. See, e.g., Jon S. Davis et al., Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax
Compliance Dynamics, 78 ACCT. REV. 39, 42 (2003) (“An . . . explanation for why
knowing a tax evader might cause honest taxpayers to consider evasion is that
observing others’ behavior can affect one’s own internalized moral standards.”).
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responsibilities. 273 As in the current system, the imposition of a
fine for noncompliance carries with it the signal that evasion is
not acceptable. 274 Of course, measured enforcement would entail
auditing some categories of taxpayers at a higher rate than
others. 275 That is true in the current system as well.276 The
critical difference between the current enforcement system and
measured enforcement is simply which categories of taxpayers
are audited more frequently.
In addition, because measured enforcement focuses on
increasing efficiency rather than revenue, it need not keep audit
rates relatively nontransparent. Instead, it contemplates
publicizing them so that taxpayers can respond to the actual risk
of audit rather than an incorrect guess. Of course, this increased
transparency, coupled with the reallocation of audit resources,
could affect taxpayer behavior. It is possible that in the short run,
taxpayers in more highly audited industries would resent the
taxing authority and be tempted to increase their levels of
evasion. That might require increasing audit rates and penalties
if they are not sufficiently high at the outset to limit this
reaction. 277 As long as affected taxpayers have the funds to pay
the fines, which publicly held corporations facing a transparent
273. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
274. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes
Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J.
1231, 1240 (2000) (arguing that a fine can reinforce a social norm). But see Uri
Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10–11 (2002)
(finding that imposing a fine on parents late picking up their children from
daycare increased parents’ tardiness).
275. See infra note 286.
276. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 219 (showing 2012 overall
income tax audit rates of 1.0% for individuals; 0.2% for estates’ and trusts’
income tax returns; 1.1% for small corporations other than S corporations;
17.8% for large corporations; and 0.5% for both partnerships and S
corporations).
277. It is worth noting that the higher-than-normal fines in our examples
are not required for measured enforcement to increase social welfare. We used a
50% fine (of unpaid taxes) to simplify the presentation, but nothing in our model
implies that fines would generally need to be so high for measured tax
enforcement to increase welfare. See supra notes 160–66 (showing in the general
model that high fines are not essential to achieving benefits via measured
enforcement).
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auditing and penalty system should, 278 these changes should not
pose a significant barrier to the measured enforcement approach.
5. Fairness (Horizontal Equity)
As noted above, the current tax enforcement system, which
necessarily involves less than 100% enforcement, gives rise to an
“audit lottery.” 279 Such an audit-selection process means that
similarly situated taxpayers are treated differently, because some
noncompliant taxpayers are audited and owe the taxes and
penalties, while others—including some with exactly the same
economic characteristics—escape detection. 280 Such differential
treatment might be thought to be “unfair” because it violates the
principle of horizontal equity, namely that “similarly situated
individuals face similar tax burdens.”281
There is a debate among tax scholars as to whether
horizontal equity has any normative content, at least
independent of the concept of “vertical equity,” which entails
appropriately treating differently situated taxpayers. 282 Although
278. Although taxpayers could try to appear cash-poor so as to limit
collectability, publicly held corporations are subject to regulatory regimes that
make such artifice difficult to accomplish. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011)
(making unlawful fraud “by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange”).
279. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
280. See Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion, Labour Supply, and The
Equity–Efficiency Tradeoff, 16 J. PUB. ECON. 265, 287 (1982) (“A solution in
which a small fraction of the number of tax evaders is punished very severely is
certainly inequitable, . . . and the very possibility of such outcomes may conflict
rather sharply with one’s sense of justice.”).
281. David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 43 (2006). Tax evasion itself also raises concerns about
horizontal equity because “taxpayers with equal income may either choose
honesty and pay their taxes, evade and escape detection, or evade and get
caught,” resulting in differing tax payments. Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 21,
at 347.
282. See James R. Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisted, in THE
PROPER TAX BASE: STRUCTURAL FAIRNESS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1–2 (Yariv Brauner & Martin J. McMahon Jr.,
eds., Kluwer International Publishing 2012) (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1927984 (explaining that Louis Kaplow and Richard
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a number of scholars have argued that the concept of horizontal
equity lacks any independent normative content, 283 it does
resonate with many people as a fairness principle.284
Although horizontal equity is often considered in connection
with substantive tax laws, it also arises in connection with tax
administration. In a world with less than a 100% audit rate, if
audit guidelines are considered ex ante—where presumably all
similarly situated taxpayers have a similar probability of audit—
they may seem horizontally equitable, but the results to
taxpayers will differ ex post after some taxpayers are audited and
some are not. 285 Accordingly, Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija
explain that “[e]vasion creates horizontal inequity because
otherwise equally well off people end up with different tax
burdens.” 286 Thus, any tax system that cannot prevent all tax
evasion, including the current system, will have horizontal
inequities resulting from that evasion. Moreover, Jim Repetti and
Diane Ring argue that, “[i]n deciding who should be audited, it is
necessary to refer to something beyond [horizontal equity].” 287
They explain that horizontal equity does not speak to what the
tax enforcer is seeking to maximize—be it revenue, utility, or
something else. 288
Musgrave both argued that horizontal equity has no normative content, but
Musgrave changed his mind after reading Kaplow’s article).
283. See id. at 2 (“We agree with Musgrave I’s original assessment and later
determinations by Kaplow and [McDaniel & Repetti]. HE [(Horizontal Equity)]
does not serve a useful role in formulating tax policy.”).
284. See id. at 10 (“In an effort to discern and specify the undeniable appeal
of HE, scholars have carved out a role, but one that is not on par with VE
[(Vertical Equity)] and does not make claims on substantive tax policy design.”).
285. See Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 88, at 13 (“While a random audit
policy is horizontally equitable in an ex ante sense (i.e. before anyone is audited
they face an identical probability of audit), it is not horizontally equitable ex
post (i.e. some individuals with the same income are audited while others are
not).”).
286. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 178 (MIT Press 4th ed. 2008).
287. Repetti & Ring, supra note 282, at 18 (“[Horizontal equity] does not
guide us in selecting among these objectives. It is necessary to once again appeal
to some other source to decide how to best accomplish enforcement.”).
288. See id. (“The difficulty with this analysis is that [horizontal equity] is
not helpful in insuring even-handed enforcement. In a world of finite resources,
not every taxpayer can be audited.” (footnote omitted)).
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Our model, which contemplates a system of probabilistic
enforcement in order to dampen potential welfare losses from
taxation, does just that—optimizing utility for example by
focusing on taxpayers whose products are highly inelastic or
produce substantial negative externalities. 289 Notably, however,
our model differs from the current revenue-maximizing strategy,
because the enforcement agency in our approach contemplates—
and in fact depends upon—some noncompliance in order to
increase social welfare. 290 Thus, like the current system, it will
inevitably contain ex post horizontal inequities. The question
then becomes whether targeting enforcement so as to
intentionally audit some types of taxpayers (such as sellers of
goods that produce negative externalities) more than others
increases those inequities. 291
Measured enforcement will increase horizontal inequities in
less-audited sectors and reduce them in more heavily audited
sectors. 292 Given the same (or at least nearly the same) revenue
target as in the current system, measured enforcement should
therefore not increase horizontal inequity, but simply shift it.
289. See supra Part III. There is an additional “fairness” concern that we
abstracted away from regarding the elasticity of products. For instance, the
demand for food is relatively inelastic, while the demand for opera tickets is
elastic. See James Allison, Demand Economics and Experimental Psychology, 24
BEHAV. SCI. 403, 406 (1979) (noting that economists generally “suppose that
demand for nonessential commodities is more elastic than demand for
essentials”). Thus, a strict focus on enforcing the tax on inelastic products might
result in an undesired distributive shift in real income from the poor to the
wealthy. Of course, as in any tax system, unwanted distributive effects might
call for deviations from the most “efficient” enforcement scheme.
290. See supra Part III; Cowell, supra note 21, at 185 (“Considerations of
horizontal equity—which connote ex post ‘fairness’ in the tax treatment of
individuals—or simple retribution thus seems to be an essential prop to the
anti-evasion argument.”).
291. Cf. Cowell, supra note 82, at 278 (“If [the] legislator or public policy
analyst truly believes that evasion per se is a ‘bad thing’, then one must be
prepared to accept some form of paternalistic overriding of individual
preferences for the sake of imposing horizontal equity . . . .”); Scotchmer, supra
note 96, at 229 (“[E]nforcement policies designed to maximize net revenue affect
the equity properties of the effective tax code.”).
292. This is an ex post perspective. Ex ante, measured enforcement will not
increase horizontal inequity because it treats only differently situated
taxpayers—such as sellers of different goods—differently.
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Ultimately, horizontal equity generally comes at the price of
failing to maximize overall social welfare, and setting the optimal
balance between social utility and horizontal equity has no clear
solution. 293 However, because measured enforcement would leave
horizontal inequities in the aggregate roughly the same as they
are under the current system, this thorny issue does not pose a
barrier for a measured enforcement system.
6. The Role of Allocative Distortions
While measured enforcement may not lead to net horizontal
inequities, it does shift the enforcement locus, which could very
well cause allocative distortions. That is, the presence of a lowertaxed sector can give rise to distortions as taxpayers migrate into
that sector. 294 This point is a distinct one from the social benefits
that can be obtained by the reduction in market distortions that
tax evasion entails. In order to tease out the issue of whether and
when the welfare benefits or the allocative distortions dominate,
Carl Davidson, Lawrence Martin, and John Douglas Wilson
developed a model similar to the model of Urs Schweizer, 295
discussed above, 296 in which the world is divided into a “legal
market,” in which risk-neutral sellers pay taxes and a “black
market,” in which they evade taxes. 297 Like Schweizer, Davidson
et al. recognize that tax evasion may “raise[] welfare” in some
circumstances, particularly when differentiated tax treatment of

293. See Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77,
83 (1976) (“The problem for tax design is . . . to balance the desire for horizontal
equity against the utilitarian principle of welfare maximization. Balancing these
two goals requires an explicit measure of the departure from horizontal equity. I
can offer no obvious or compelling solution to this problem.”).
294. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 286, at 180 (providing an example of
housepainters who accept cash, which gives rise to a “supply of eager
housepainters”).
295. Davidson et al., supra note 117, at 1575–76.
296. See supra notes 97–111.
297. Davidson et al., supra note 117, at 1578–85; see also Carl Davidson et
al., Tax Evasion as an Optimal Tax Device, 86 ECON. LETT. 285, 285–86 (2005)
(presenting a similar model).
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differing goods is optimal but information asymmetries and other
costs “limit the government’s power” to implement such taxes.298
The Davidson et al. model makes several assumptions:
consumers can purchase at most one unit of the good in the
model, the good varies among firms in its “quality” level, and
consumers have heterogeneous tastes. 299 In addition, some firms
in their model have fewer assets, while others have more.
Because tax evasion risks detection and imposition of a penalty
that is capped by the amount of assets the tax authority can seize
from any given taxpayer, lower-asset firms choose to operate in
the black market, while higher-asset firms do not. 300
With this setup, Davidson et al. find that if the black market
consists of high-quality goods, there is a welfare benefit from the
small amount of evasion resulting from a black market, because
the black market results in a correction of the allocative
distortion resulting from uniform taxation, which otherwise
suppresses the sale of high-quality goods. 301 By contrast, if the
black market consists of low-quality goods, there are some
welfare benefits through purchases that would not have been
made if only high-quality goods were offered (given consumers’
heterogeneous quality preferences), but these benefits are
outweighed by the allocative distortions from the introduction of
the low-quality goods. 302 Davidson et al. also explain that the
government can set the tax evasion penalty at a level that results
298. Davidson et al., supra note 117, at 1585–86. Their starting point for the
proposition that a black market may be welfare-enhancing is an undergraduate
public finance textbook, H.S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE (McGraw-Hill/Irwin 7th
ed. 2005). See id. at 1575–76.
299. See id. at 1576 (“[W]e next assume that the tax system distorts the
decision of whether to devote resources to any taxed activity.”).
300. See id. at 1577 (“By capping the maximum fines at the firm’s total
assets, we are essentially assuming that higher fines are precluded by either the
economy’s legal system (e.g., limited liability) or the excessive costs needed to
obtain them.”).
301. See id. (“[A] black market can be desirable, even when audits are
costless, because it partially corrects the distorting effect that a uniform tax
system has on the allocation of resources across taxed activities.”).
302. See id. (“Black markets containing high-quality goods improve the
allocation. With low-quality goods, the misallocation is so severe that it offsets
any welfare gains from the ability of black markets to draw resources into taxed
activities as a whole.”).
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in the black market consisting of high-quality goods (thus always
optimizing welfare). 303
Our model abstracted away from these concerns by assuming
that product markets were fully competitive and that the
government could tax away all producer surplus. 304 In this
situation, measured enforcement would not lead to secondary
distortions in product markets. 305 However, if the government
reduced enforcement in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, or
set its audit rates and fines so as to introduce substantial
secondary allocative effects, then the Davidson et al. model, and
extensions to it, would need to be considered. For these reasons,
we recommend that any experiment with measured enforcement
not only be limited to sophisticated taxpayers, but also to taxes
on product sales made by sellers operating in highly competitive,
mature markets. 306
V. Conclusion
“Taxes are the life-blood of government,” 307 so optimizing
enforcement of the tax laws is a critically important issue. Yet,
the traditional approach of attempting to maximize tax revenues
ignores the overall welfare costs of strict enforcement of the tax
laws. 308 The model developed in this article, which applies
regardless of the taxpayer’s risk profile, demonstrates how a tax
authority can increase overall social welfare by “measuring” its
enforcement of suboptimal tax laws. By taking into account
deadweight losses and other distortions caused by taxation, the
tax authority can adjust its enforcement rates to reduce these
distortions, while maintaining or increasing overall revenue.
303. See id. at 1585 (“[O]nly the new fine schedule is needed to ensure that a
welfare-improving black market can always be created, regardless of whether
the capital intensity of production increases or declines with quality.”).
304. See supra note 171.
305. Thus, we do not believe the assumptions of Davidson et al. always
apply. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
306. Another benefit of limiting measured enforcement to mature markets is
that it eases the information burden on the enforcement agency.
307. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
308. See supra Part II.
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The examples considered in this article involve measured
enforcement of a uniform sales tax. As long as the tax authority is
able to discern the general elasticities for various products, it can
target its enforcement resources so as to increase social welfare.
In particular, the tax authority would decrease the enforcement
of taxes on highly elastic goods and those creating large positive
externalities, and the opposite for highly inelastic goods and
those creating large negative externalities, resulting in fewer
allocative distortions from the sales tax, but the same or
increased sales tax collections.
Of course, in order to implement a measured enforcement
strategy, the enforcement agency would have to be sufficiently
knowledgeable about the distorting effects of taxation. Yet, while
tax authorities might not be able to obtain, for example, detailed
supply and demand information, they should be able to discern—
at least at the extremes—which goods are highly elastic (such as
books) and which are highly inelastic (such as gasoline). Even
making such rough distinctions can lead to gains in overall social
welfare. Because tax enforcement agencies generally are
insulated from political processes and are on-the-ground experts,
they may have a greater ability than the legislature does to
achieve effectively differentiated taxation. However, the
legislature remains free to respond to the effects that measured
enforcement has on the de facto content of the laws, adjusting the
substantive laws to achieve desired results.
Although measured enforcement would be carried out at the
agency level, rather than via political processes, it would not need
to reduce transparency compared to the current system. Rather,
audit rates would be more heavily publicized than under the
current system. Nor would it be advertised as a system that
promotes “cheating”—which could result in undesired
noncompliance—but rather as a transparent audit regime applied
to sophisticated taxpayers. Publicity about the penalties for
cheating should also help serve as an enforcement mechanism
and as a signal that noncompliance is not normatively acceptable.
The proposed measured enforcement approach also would not
result in any additional horizontal inequity. Although, as in any
system in which there is tax evasion, allocative distortions will
result due to the higher return to tax-evading sectors, the
economics literature demonstrates that the efficiency gains from
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an appropriate level of noncompliance can exceed the losses from
allocative distortions if an enforcement program is properly
designed.
The benefits of measured enforcement are not limited to the
tax context. The fundamental insight that imperfect enforcement
may give rise to beneficial effects is applicable in an array of legal
contexts, including not only regulatory law, but many fields of
public and private law. In essence, whenever the cost of
particularized rulemaking is sufficiently high, measured
enforcement may lead to overall welfare gains via de facto
changes in the substantive law. More generally, when the
substantive law is not ideal, and amending it is not feasible, the
government can improve the situation by measuring enforcement
of the substantive law.

